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BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE STRUGGLE
TO ANALYZE SCHOOL BOARD PRAYER AND A NEW
METHOD OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
ABSTRACT
The constitutionality of public school board prayer under the First
Amendment Establishment Clause has vexed lower federal courts for over two
decades. With only an inconsistent string of Supreme Court cases to rely upon,
lower courts have been forced to choose between competing doctrines and
frameworks that embody different interests and were designed for different
circumstances.
Nowhere is this struggle more aptly displayed than in the current split
between the Fifth Circuit in American Humanist Association v. McCarty and
the Ninth Circuit in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chino Valley Unified
School Board. The Fifth Circuit argued that the school board prayer of the
Birdville Independent School District is constitutional because it falls under the
Supreme Court’s legislative prayer doctrine. Relying on the long tradition of
opening American legislatures with prayer dating back to the Founding Era, the
doctrine upholds such prayers in other state-based gatherings. Conversely, the
Ninth Circuit struck down Chino Valley’s school board prayer, arguing that the
school board is too intertwined with the school day and student life, and
therefore the prayer should be analyzed under school prayer caselaw, using
either the Lemon or coercion tests that struck down all such prayers at public
school events.
This Comment argues that neither of these approaches is appropriate alone
to address the constitutionality of school board prayers challenged under the
Establishment Clause. School board meetings are similar to state legislative
sessions in that they mostly involve adults who are voluntarily present and can
make their own judgments about whether to attend or listen to the prayer. But
public school boards are undeniably intertwined with the public school day and
sometimes do involve students who are young and impressionable, along with
other participants who have no real choice but to appear at the meeting,
necessarily implicating coercion concerns. However, school boards are much
less student-centered than other regular school activities where the risk of
coercion is heightened. Adopting one of these Establishment Clause approaches
for this unique and variable setting, as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have done,
leads to unsatisfactory analysis and ultimately fails to capture all the concerns
inherent in this unique setting.
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This Comment proposes an original balancing test—one that protects
parties against religious coercion and respects traditional practices—that
draws on and sequences two Supreme Court approaches to the Establishment
Clause. Under this test, the coercive effect of the prayer policy should first be
measured to prevent blatantly coercive practices from constitutional approval
solely because they have a longstanding history. Then, where a practice passes
this initial threshold, any coercive effect will be balanced against the history and
tradition of acknowledging prayer and religious heritage in public life. This test
more fully encapsulates the concerns inherent in the school board setting,
honors our tolerance of some religious acknowledgment in public life, unifies
elements of previously disparate Establishment Clause precedent, and is based
on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
“If you could bow your heads and join me in a prayer,” requests Birdville
High School student Kaiya Harris-Stephens as she stands at a lectern at the front
of the Birdville Administration Building boardroom.1 Beside her stands a
classmate who just finished leading the standing audience of adults and students
in the U.S. and Texas Pledges of Allegiance.2 In front of her, raised above the
crowd on a wood-paneled platform flanked by flags, stand the members of the
Birdville Independent School District Board.3 At every monthly meeting, the
Board invites student volunteers to open the public session with the Pledge of
Allegiance and a student expression.4 For Ms. Harris-Stephens’s student
expression, the Board members and audience respectfully bow their heads in
unison and listen to her prayer, which requests that the “Heavenly Father”
provide protection and guidance in the coming school year.5 The audience and
Board unanimously conclude the prayer with an “Amen” before sitting down to
proceed with the remaining agenda.6
Over one thousand miles away, the residents of the Chino Valley Unified
School District similarly gather approximately eighteen times per year for their
public school board meetings.7 After being led in the U.S. Pledge of Allegiance
by an elementary school student, the Board President often introduces a local
religious leader to lead the assembly in prayer.8 On one occasion, Pastor Lehman
of the Gateway Community Church, a Christian congregation, instructed the
1
Jul 25, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (July 25, 2019),
https://birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38351 (items D & E at 2:15).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2017).
5
Jul 25, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, supra note 1.
6
Id.
7
Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138
(9th Cir. 2018).
8
See Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. Videos, SBM 2016 01 07, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhBOPx7FYws&feature=youtu.be.
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audience to seek the wisdom to obtain favor from the Lord.9 Immediately
following the collective “Amen,” students from the Cal Aero Preserve Academy
band performed in a student showcase that nearly always follows the
invocation.10 The Board and audience listened to the performance, congratulated
the students, and continued to the rest of the business before the Board.11
These scenes from the Birdville Independent School District and Chino
Valley Unified School District board meetings demonstrate the next frontier in
the decades-long struggle to faithfully interpret and apply the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.12 School boards are generally charged with
administering and governing the public school education of thousands of
students. Similar to a legislature, these boards vote on proposals, set policy, craft
budgets, and oversee school personnel and performance. However, more than a
mere administrative body, school boards are deeply intertwined with the school
day and necessarily affect every student in their jurisdictions. As a consequence,
students regularly attend board meetings to perform, receive recognition, and
petition and engage the democratic body that makes decisions on their behalf.
This mixture of elements has proven legally difficult. Indeed, when it comes to
the best way to classify and analyze prayers offered at the beginning of public
school board meetings, federal circuit courts are split.13
Prayer that occurs at the direction, promotion, or encouragement of a
government body such as a school board naturally raises Establishment Clause
concerns. However, the unique characteristics of the school board invokes two
competing Establishment Clause principles: (1) the desire of public bodies to
solemnify meetings and honor the best of our religious traditions; and (2) the
necessity of protecting impressionable students from government-sponsored
religious coercion. Opponents who bring Establishment Clause challenges to
school board prayer practices argue that they are the equivalent of
unconstitutional school prayer. Conversely, proponents of these policies insist
that they qualify as constitutional legislative prayer. The result of these
competing viewpoints is a divided federal circuit struggling to articulate why
one of these approaches necessarily triumphs over the other.

9

Id. Pastor Lehman is introduced at 2:07.
Id.
11
Id.; see Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at 1138.
12
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
13
See infra Part II.A–C.
10
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This struggle is evident in the current split between the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in analyzing the Birdville Independent School
District’s prayer policy, held that the school board is similar to a meeting of the
legislature.14 Consequently, the court held that Supreme Court precedent permits
such prayer at a school board meeting because it is a part of our history,
following in the tradition and spirit of legislative prayer.15 The Fifth Circuit
rooted this approach in Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Supreme Court
declined to apply the Lemon test to the Nebraska state legislature’s practice of
opening each session with a prayer from an appointed and paid chaplain.16
Instead, the Court upheld the practice for the sole reason that legislative prayer
is “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”17 The Court
reinforced this approach in Town of Greece v. Galloway when considering the
prayer practice at the public meetings of the Town of Greece, New York.18
There, the Court emphasized the need to analyze the Establishment Clause “by
reference to historical practices and understandings.”19 Accordingly, the Court
upheld the prayer practice on the basis of history alone, eschewing conventional
Establishment Clause precedent and tests.20
Unlike state legislature and town council meetings, however, school board
meetings sometimes do include both students and adults; they also take place on
public school premises within earshot of other students.21 Further, there is no
robust, longstanding history of prayers at school board meetings. Perhaps
because of this, only the Fifth Circuit has adopted the purely historical
approach—one employed sporadically but increasingly—to the constitutionality
of these school board prayers.
Meanwhile, after reviewing Chino Valley’s prayer policy, the Ninth Circuit
held that the school board setting is inherently different than that of the
legislative setting.22 The court reasoned that, given its entanglement with the
14

Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 527–28.
16
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). The Lemon test considers whether the challenged
policy (1) has a legitimate secular purpose, (2) has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3)
fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971).
17
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
18
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
19
Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
20
Id. at 575 (“The Court in Marsh found those tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion
that legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.”).
21
See infra Part III.A.
22
Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1145
15
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school day, the school board is best analyzed using the Supreme Court’s school
prayer cases and the Lemon test.23 This approach is rooted in the Supreme
Court’s original concerns of government sponsorship of religion, the individual
nature of faith, and the preservation of secular education in public schools.24
Recently, in both Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, the Court stressed that school-sponsored prayers effectively coerced
impressionable young students into religious participation, contrary to the
purpose of Establishment Clause.25 However, while the school board is operated
by school authorities and intertwined with the education of students, as the Ninth
Circuit recognizes, it is far less student-centered than the public school during
the school day.
Neither of these approaches fits the unique context of the public school board
meeting. Instead, this Comment introduces an original balancing test to analyze
the constitutionality of prayer in this blended setting.26 Given the Court’s
decades-long turn towards a historical Establishment Clause approach and
recent instruction in American Legion v. American Humanist Association27 to
“look[] to history for guidance,”28 a new tailored approach anchored in more
recent and relevant precedent is the most appropriate mechanism for addressing
prayer at a school board setting.29 This approach follows Justice Kavanaugh’s

(9th Cir. 2018).
23
Id. at 1148.
24
See id. at 1149 (explaining the Lemon test requires a governmental practice to (1) have “a secular
legislative purpose;” (2) have a “primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion;” and (3) “not
foster ‘an excessive entanglement with religion’” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971))).
25
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312
(2000).
26
See infra Part III.
27
139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081–82, 2089 (2019) (holding that a nearly one-hundred-year-old cross
commemorating America’s fallen soldiers in World War I was presumptively constitutional after eschewing
traditional Establishment Clause tests and instead considering the monument’s constitutionality in light of
history and tradition).
28
Id. at 2087 (citation omitted).
29
The Court in American Legion also opined that “[t]he passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption
of constitutionality,” and that “[w]here categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding
history follow in [the tradition of tolerance, inclusivity, and nondiscrimination], they are likewise constitutional.”
Id. at 2085, 2089. A concurring opinion and at least one lower court have questioned how longstanding or
established something must be for this presumption to apply. Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“How old
must a monument, symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption?”); Woodring v. Jackson County,
986 F.3d 979, 994 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e are unable to conclude, as a threshold matter, that the County’s nativity
scene is ‘longstanding’ or ‘established,’ such that American Legion’s presumption could attach.”). As discussed
infra in Part III.A, this Comment assumes arguendo that American Legion’s presumption of constitutionality
does not apply because of this lack of guidance or clarifying precedent, the unique nature of the school board
(which inherently raises other important concerns such as coercion), and the fact that school board prayer does
not trigger the concerns which led the Court to reject the Lemon test in that case. It instead takes the more general
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concurrence in American Legion, in which he concludes that the Court is now
applying “a history and tradition test” under which prayer policies will be upheld
“[i]f the challenged government practice is not coercive and . . . is rooted in
history and tradition.”30 Given that the school board is entwined with the school
day and students, this Comment’s proposed test uses coercion as the threshold
to prevent truly coercive practices from gaining constitutional approval simply
because they are longstanding. Where a prayer practice is not so coercive to fail
at the outset, it will then be balanced against the accepted history and tradition
of prayer at the school board and our tolerance of religious acknowledgment in
public life more generally to determine if it is constitutional. This proposed test
is based on recent Court precedent and more accurately encompasses the
elements and concerns inherent in the school board setting.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the development of
the two Establishment Clause approaches used in the circuit split—the school
prayer jurisprudence and the legislative prayer doctrine—to demonstrate how
school board prayer does not fit into either. Part II reviews the struggle of lower
courts for over two decades to analyze school board prayer and concludes with
an analysis of the recent and contrary Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions. Finally,
Part III explains why no approach to school board prayer to date has been
satisfactory, presents a new test balancing history and coercion, and applies that
test to the Fifth and Ninth Circuit split.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE TWO RELEVANT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
APPROACHES

Lower courts, including the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, have relied primarily
on two distinct approaches to the Establishment Clause: one approach analyzing
unconstitutional school prayer and another approach considering constitutional
legislative prayer. Section A discusses the Court’s school prayer jurisprudence,
including the original principles that first animated the Court to reject prayer in
public schools. This section concludes with a discussion of the Court’s recent
focus on the coercive effect of school prayer. Section B traces the Court’s
development of the legislative prayer doctrine from Marsh v. Chambers to Town
of Greece v. Galloway, recounts the subsequent turn towards historical
consideration when deciding Establishment Clause conflicts, and concludes with
the limited application of that approach in lower courts.
instruction of the Court that history, whether alone or with other factors, must now be considered in any
Establishment Clause analysis. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081–85.
30
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2092–93 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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A. School Prayer
Recognizing the importance of secular education,31 the Supreme Court has
resisted the presence of religion in the public school classroom.32 Cases spanning
the last three-quarters of a century reveal numerous principles that served as the
basis for invalidating religious instruction in public schools. Recently, however,
the Court has turned its school-prayer analysis away from these earlier principles
and towards one based on the idea of coercion, a standard appropriate in
analyzing settings associated with the school day and the impressionable student
body.33
Subsection one details three main principles that served as the foundation of
earlier school prayer cases: (1) the government cannot direct or sponsor religion
in public schools; (2) interdependence should be avoided to protect government
and religion from each other; and (3) schools that serve a secular rather than
sectarian purpose should be protected. Subsection two discusses the emergence
of coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, followed by an identification of factors to be considered in a
coercion analysis in subsection three.
1. Animating Principles in Early School Prayer Cases
The first principle is that government cannot direct or sponsor religion in
public schools. This principle exists as a broader concern of the Establishment
Clause and the First Amendment, informing jurisprudence even before many
school-prayer cases.34 Best summarized by the Court in its first school prayer

31
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Education] is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Notes on Virginia, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 204, 206 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (arguing
public education is where the “principal foundations of future order will be laid,” ensuring that the people remain
“the safe . . . [and] ultimate . . . guardians of their own liberty”).
32
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (“The Court has been particularly vigilant
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”); McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216–17 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he public school must keep
scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects.”).
33
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that clergy-led prayer at a public school’s
graduation ceremony violates the Constitution because the Establishment Clause “guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (holding that student-led prayer at a public school’s football game violates the
Establishment Clause because the “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or
its exercise” (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587)).
34
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
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case, Engel v. Vitale, “it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by the government.”35 Government involvement in
religion is thought to be insidious for a number of reasons, chief among them
the protection of minority groups.36 Minority religious groups tend to become
the targets of oppression when the government places its weight behind a
particular creed, as “governmentally established religions and religious
persecutions go hand in hand.”37 Indeed, it was our forebearers’ experience with
the official church establishment of Europe that compelled them to leave their
homes for the distant shores of what would become the United States.38
The Court relied on this principle in School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp, where the school broadcasted prayers to its classrooms over the
loudspeaker or through the homeroom teacher.39 Here, the Court concluded that
the “majority [cannot] use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs,”40
and that government power should not be used to either assist or hinder religion
so as to avoid the union of government and religion.41 This concern holds true
even where the government does not compose the prayer and only “intend[s] to
characterize prayer as a favored practice” in the course of the school day.42
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
35
370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
36
Id. at 431 (“When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain.”).
37
Id. at 432. The Court also notes that throughout history when government has allied itself with religion,
the “inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held
contrary beliefs.” Id. at 431.
38
Id. at 425 (“It is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed
prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England
and seek religious freedom in America.”). Through “bitter personal experience,” the people understood the
dangers of the government “placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one
particular form of religious services,” as it often results in “shackl[ing] men’s tongues to make them speak only
the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak.” Id. at 429, 435.
39
374 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1963).
40
Id. at 226.
41
Id. at 222; see also McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(arguing separation requires abstaining from “fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely
to treat them all equally”). Although the decision in McCollum was based primarily on the financial support of
the government, Frankfurter’s concurrence focused on the “approval and supervision of the superintendent”
required for the religious groups to come into the school and the fact that the religious program was “patently
woven into the working scheme of the school.” Id. at 226, 227.
42
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (holding the Alabama law providing for a moment of silence
for meditation “or voluntary prayer” unconstitutional); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308–09, 315 (1952)
(holding the released time program, in which students could leave school to attend religious institutions for
instruction, constitutional because it neither took place on school grounds nor employed public funds in its
implementation).
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The Court also considers financial backing of religion as part of the principle
of religious sponsorship.43 Of concern is the “utilization of the tax-established
and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith.”44 In McCollum v. Board of Education, the Court invalidated a program
allowing religious instructors to provide religious instruction to those students
whose parents consented, concerned by the use of “tax-supported property for
religious instruction.”45
The second principle the Court has emphasized in early school-prayer cases
is that government and religion should operate in separate spheres because
intermingling threatens the sanctity of both.46 To intertwine the two “tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion”47 by “inject[ing] political and party
prejudices into a holy field . . . [,] substitut[ing] force for prayer, hate for love,
and persecution for persuasion.”48 Similarly, the Court has insisted that faith is
individual in nature and that belief is fostered and flourishes when it is “the
product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful.”49 This principle exists as a
part of the broader freedom of conscience, where the individual retains the
“freedom to choose his own creed [that] is the counterpart of his right to refrain
from accepting the creed established by the majority.”50 Although “religion has
closely been identified with our history and government,”51 the spirituality of
man is “withdr[awn] from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern.”52
Otherwise, deeply personal decisions regarding religion would be “subjected to
the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration
is elected to office.”53
43
See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The most effective way to establish any
institution is to finance it . . . .”).
44
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[The
Establishment Clause] also forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds in a way that gives any church, or
all churches, greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on its members alone.”).
45
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 207–08, 209.
46
See, e.g., id. at 212 (“[B]oth religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each
is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into
the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which
becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government.”).
47
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
48
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
49
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985); see also Zorach, 343 U.S. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“The choice of all has been as free as the choice of those who answered the call to worship moved only by the
music of the old Sunday morning church bells.”).
50
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 51, 52.
51
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212.
52
Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
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Finally, our society has recognized the need to educate young citizens and
considers the public school a “most vital civic institution for the preservation of
a democratic system of government.”54 Rather than “putting the Bible and
Testament into the hands of the children,”55 public school serves the function of
“assimilat[ing] a heritage common to all American groups and religions.”56
While exposure to a diversity of ideas is an important aspect of education,57 the
Court has recognized a difference between scholarly curiosity and religious
instruction where students’ beliefs may sharply diverge.58 While public
education should honor history and tradition,59 ultimately, the Court stresses the
avoidance of conflict in this realm.60 This is especially true in the mandatory
school setting, where children are required to attend.61
In early school prayer cases, coercion is largely ignored or deemed a nonissue by a majority of the Court.62 Even in a concurrence or dissent where
54
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring); Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038,
2046 (2021) (“America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy.”); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and
the most pervasive means of promoting our common destiny.”).
55
JEFFERSON, supra note 31, at 204; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (“The assumption is that, after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom, he will be
better fitted to choose his religion.”).
56
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J. concurring).
57
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (“To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive
content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon
open discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry.”).
58
See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[There is a] religious diversity among
the population which our public schools serve.”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (“Families
entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the
student and his or her family.”).
59
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (noting that encouraging or cooperating with religious
instruction outside of the public school follows the “best of our traditions”); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 606 (Powell,
J., concurring) (“As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properly be informed of all aspects of
this Nation’s religious heritage.”); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 236 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should suppose it is
a proper, if not an indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions
have played in the tragic story of mankind.”).
60
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing the “strife of sects” should be
avoided in the public school because it is the area in which “conflicts are most easily and most bitterly
engendered”).
61
See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (emphasizing that the prayer occurred as a “prescribed . . . part of the
curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school”).
62
While Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in McCollum acknowledged that the religious program put
“obvious pressure upon children to attend” and created a “feeling of separatism,” he largely grounded his
analysis on the financial support and sponsorship by the government. 333 U.S. at 227. In Engel v. Vitale, the
Court ignored any coercive effect that the policy may have in requiring children to recite prayers and instead
focused on the government’s composition and dictation of prayer. McCollum, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). In
concurrence, Justice Douglas went as far as to say that there is “no element of compulsion or coercion” present.
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coercion is analyzed, it is often only legal coercion that is considered as opposed
to other social pressures.63 Beginning in the 1980s, the Court began to more
explicitly acknowledge, even if only in passing, that religion in the school not
only presents traditional Establishment Clause concerns like those detailed
above, but that the setting of the school and the audience of impressionable
young children make coercion a relevant factor.64 It was not until Lee v.
Weisman65 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe66 that the Court
firmly brought coercion analysis to the forefront.67
2. Lee, Santa Fe, and the Rise of Coercion Analysis
The controversy in Lee centered around the graduation ceremony held by
Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school in Providence, Rhode Island.68
The ceremony took place on school grounds and students entered the venue as a
group at “the direction of teachers and school officials.”69 The Providence
Id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Schempp, although the Court found that students were compelled to stand
in unison and recite the prayer, it still concluded that the Free Exercise Clause, rather than the Establishment
Clause, is concerned with coercion. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223. Justice O’Connor in Allegheny even concluded
that “this Court has never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis.” County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgement).
63
See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232–33 (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that even though a student who
does not participate may be forced to “set himself apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating,” without legal
compulsion the issue of coercion is immaterial); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 289, 290, 292, 299 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the coercive pressure on “impressionable children” to conform, which places them
in a “cruel dilemma” of either participating against their conscience or “profess[ing] publicly his disbelief,”
putting him in a “class by himself” (quoting Herold v. Par. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 116, 121 (La. 1915))); see
also Zorach, 343 U.S. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing the released time program coerced students to
attend religious instruction because otherwise the classroom “serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not
go to Church”).
64
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a posted Ten Commandments
in a classroom may “induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the
Commandments”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgement)
(noting the coercive choice forced upon students in deciding either to participate or compromise their beliefs as
a part of the Endorsement test). In Aguillard, the majority emphasized that “[t]he State exerts great authority and
coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers
as role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.” Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 584. However, the
majority used a traditional Lemon analysis to strike down the statute rather than rely on this coercion analysis.
Id. at 585.
65
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
66
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
67
For an argument on “the centrality of coercion” in Establishment Clause analysis, see Michael W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940 (1986) (arguing
the Court arbitrarily removed coercion as an element of the Establishment Clause and “[r]ecognition of the
centrality of coercion” in Establishment Clause analysis would lead to better reasoned opinions).
68
Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
69
Id. at 583.
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School Committee permitted principals to invite local clergy to give an
invocation at these ceremonies, with the guidance that the benediction be
inclusive and non-sectarian.70 In the presence of their families and the
community, students were directed to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance and
then remain standing for the invocation to come.71 Once challenged, the District
Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals struck the practice down, applying
the Lemon test to conclude that it violated the Establishment Clause.72
The Court, led by Justice Kennedy, began by emphasizing that the
Constitution minimally stands for the proposition that “government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”73 While much
of the Court’s analysis relies on the control and involvement of the State over
the selection of clergy and the prayer given,74 similar to past Court decisions,
the determinative factor became the “subtle coercive pressures” that exist in a
secondary school setting where the State makes choices regarding religious
exercises in which students feel compelled to participate.75 Important to the
Court was the perception by the students that the prayer bears the “imprint of the
State,” thus “inducing a participation [the student] might otherwise reject.”76
This coercion concern exists distinctly in the public school setting, where
students may perceive the State as placing its weight behind a particular religious
tenet, even if only subtly.77 Whereas a consenting adult may more effectively
resist or separate the prayer from the government activity,78 students are
“susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity,” and
nonconformers must either participate against their conscience or dissent
publicly in front of their friends, community, and government.79 Ultimately, the
Court found that this policy amounted to the State taking advantage of the

70
Id. at 581. Prayers from these graduation ceremonies included phrases such as “O God, we are grateful
to You” and “We give thanks to You, Lord,” and typically ended with an “Amen.” Id. at 582.
71
Id. at 583.
72
Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D.R.I. 1990); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1094 (1st Cir.
1990). In a dissent, Judge Campbell of the First Circuit voted to uphold the policy based on Marsh v. Chambers.
Lee, 908 F.2d at 1099 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
73
Lee, 505 U.S. at 580, 587.
74
Id. The Court claims that the choice of invocation is “attributable to the State” and the potential for
divisiveness stemming from this choice is obvious. Id.
75
Id. at 588.
76
Id. at 590.
77
See id. at 593 (finding it reasonable for a school-aged child to perceive the State as forcing her to “pray
in a manner her conscience will not allow”).
78
Id. at 597 (differentiating the school setting from the prayer setting in Marsh, where adults could enter
and leave at will).
79
Id. at 590–93 (holding that students forced to make this choice are in an “untenable position”).

WATTS_12.15.21

286

12/16/2021 10:40 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:273

pressures students faced in this setting to compel their participation in a religious
exercise.80 According to the Court, the Constitution protects students from
having to forfeit participation in an occasion that is practically obligatory.81
This coercion-based analysis marked a dramatic shift away from earlier
Establishment Clause analysis in the public school setting, a notion recognized
by those justices concurring and dissenting.82 The Court’s majority rested its
Establishment Clause conclusions on the basis that the school setting is unique
because of the control and influence the government exerts over susceptible,
young students who, by virtue of their youth, will feel pressure, even indirectly,
to conform to religious exercises they perceive the State directing.83 Admitting
that there may be a place for religion in public schools,84 the Court still
recognized that the public school is unique from other contexts and requires an
analysis distinct from other Establishment Clause cases.85
Less than a decade later, the Court set aside any doubt that coercion is now
a relevant, if not dominant, factor in this area of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. At issue in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe was the
policy allowing student elections to determine if an invocation would be held at
football games and, if so, who would deliver the message.86 The School District
distinguished this policy from the one at issue in Lee v. Weisman by arguing that
athletic events are not essentially mandatory or significant and this is purely
private student speech.87 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding the
invocation to be “authorized by a government policy . . . on government property
at government-sponsored school-related events.”88 The football games are a
selective access forum instead of a purely public one because only one student
is chosen for the season to deliver the invocation and subject to school

80

Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.
82
See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing coercion has never been required to find that the
government has violated the Establishment Clause); id. at 622 (Souter, J., concurring) (recounting early history
to argue that unconstitutional practices under the Establishment Clause are not limited to just those that are
coercive); id. at 636, 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that historically only legal coercion has mattered,
whereas any analysis of psychological coercion is less concrete than “interior decorating”).
83
Id. at 587 (majority opinion).
84
Id. at 598–99 (“[T]here will be instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious
persons will have some interaction with the public schools and their students.”).
85
Id. at 597.
86
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297 (2000). The policy was originally titled “Prayer
at Football Games” but was changed to reference messages, statements, and invocations at football games. Id.
at 297–98.
87
Id. at 300, 302, 311.
88
Id. at 302.
81
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regulations.89 Although the school was less involved in the event than the one in
Lee, students would still “unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer
as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.”90
Just as in Lee, the Court imbued its analysis of government control of the
prayer with the coercive effect on students.91 Although students here are less
obliged to attend a football game than a graduation ceremony, “immense social
pressure” still exists and students cannot be forced to choose between “attending
these games and avoiding personally offensive religious rituals.”92 Regardless,
those students who voluntarily attend still face coercive pressure to participate
in the religious act.93 Even though this policy was technically established by a
vote of the student body, it nevertheless “subject[s] students of minority views
to constitutionally improper messages.”94
Lee and Santa Fe affirm that coercion must be considered when analyzing
the effect of a prayer policy in connection with the public school. If coercion is
a factor in a graduation ceremony and a football game—events attenuated from
the normal school day and classroom—then surely it must also be a factor in
analyzing the school board.
3. Factors to Consider in Coercion Analysis
Lee and Santa Fe reveal four factors that influence the Court when
considering the coercive effect of a prayer policy. In situations involving the
school day and students, such as the school board meeting, these factors are
important in determining if coercion is present.
The first factor is the extent to which the government controls or is involved
in selecting the speaker or crafting the message, even where it appears that the
government is trying to be neutral. In both Lee and Santa Fe, the Court stressed
the degree of influence the government holds over the prayer policy.95 However,
unlike earlier cases, in which this principle is rooted in the apprehension of
89
Id. at 303. A selective access forum is one in which the government limits and regulates both the
speaker and message, in contrast to a purely public forum in which the public can speak indiscriminately. Id.
90
Id. at 308. The Court reached this conclusion because the board allowed an invocation, regulated the
message, encouraged the message to be a prayer, and used school property to broadcast the prayer. Id. at 307–
08.
91
Id. at 310.
92
Id. at 311–12.
93
Id. at 312.
94
Id. at 316; see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“[F]undamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”).
95
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307–08.
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financial backing or dependency, here the concern is that the students are
coerced to conform because they perceive the religious exercise as endorsed,
conducted, and overseen by the government and its officials.96
The second factor is the setting in which the prayer occurs. Similar to the
first factor, a prayer that occurs on school property or at a school-sponsored
event may be perceived as being “stamped with [the] school’s seal of
approval.”97 Even off-campus settings less attenuated with the school day, such
as a graduation ceremony, football game, or other school-sponsored activity,
may sufficiently “[bear] the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children
who object[] in an untenable position.”98 Additionally, the degree to which the
student is compelled to attend the event is considered, although the event need
not be mandatory to trigger coercion concerns, and includes situations where
“absence would require forfeiture of . . . intangible benefits.”99
The third factor is the process or procedure by which the prayer occurs. As
an example, the prayer in Lee immediately followed the Pledge of Allegiance
while students were already standing.100 The order of events can contribute to
the coercive effect on the student, forcing the student to distinguish themselves
from the ceremony and sit while all others continue to stand or otherwise be
thought to be a participant in the religious exercise against their conscience. The
more deliberately a student must distinguish themselves by breaking from the
flow of events or the degree to which the student has “no real alternative which
would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation,” the
more prescient the coercive effect.101
Finally, flowing from the third factor, the fourth factor is the degree to which
the student may be compelled to conform. This final factor is a culmination of
the other three and considers all of the circumstances surrounding the prayer to
determine if the student faces peer and public pressure to conform to the
religious exercise.102 Where a student must “profess publicly his disbelief,” face
96
Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (noting students are “left with no alternative but to submit” to the “state-imposed
character of an invocation” because “[a]t a high school graduation, teachers and principals must and do retain a
high degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the
dress, and the decorum of the students”).
97
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
98
Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
99
Id. at 589, 595 (stating students, for all “practical purposes, are obliged to attend” graduation
ceremonies); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311 (stating although football games are in some ways voluntary, students
still feel “immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event”).
100
Lee, 505 U.S. at 583.
101
Id. at 588.
102
See id. at 593.
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the “understandable reluctance to be stigmatized,” and exclude themselves to
avoid participation, effectively putting the student “in a class by himself,” the
coercive effect is high.103
B. The Legislative Prayer Doctrine
While the Court has largely deemed school prayer unconstitutional, it has
taken a far more deferential stance regarding prayer at public government
meetings. Indeed, unlike public school prayer, an invocation at the beginning of
a legislative session is largely supported by history. However, the jurisprudence
invoking the Court’s legislative prayer doctrine demonstrates the struggle to
weigh the competing Establishment Clause principles of avoiding governmentsponsored religious indoctrination and acknowledging our religious history. On
the one hand, as Justice O’Connor wrote, “[w]e live in a pluralistic society. Our
citizens come from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no particular
religious beliefs at all.”104 On the other hand, as the Court noted in 1952, “[w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”105 The
struggle to respect the multitude of religious beliefs that exist in the American
populace while also appropriately paying homage to our history without veering
too close to establishing a religion has created much litigation and strife.106
This section analyzes the longstanding history of legislative prayer in
subsection one, the legislative prayer doctrine and history-based analysis in
Marsh v. Chambers in subsection two, the Court’s attempt to refine Marsh in
subsection three, and the unanimous preclusion of Marsh’s analysis in other
settings in subsection four. Subsection five analyzes the Court’s recent turn in
Van Orden v. Perry107 toward an Establishment Clause approach based in history
and tradition, followed by the further endorsement of Marsh’s approach in Town
of Greece v. Galloway in subsection six. Subsection seven concludes with the
continued reluctance of lower courts to apply this pure historical test to other
scenarios.

103

Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 289, 290, 292 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
105
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
106
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (“The First Amendment . . . stand[s] as a guarantee that
neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, support or influence the
kinds of prayer the American people can say . . . .”).
107
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
104
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1. The History of Legislative Prayer
Legislative prayer has its origins in the Continental Congress.108 Following
independence and the ratification of the Constitution, the members of the First
Congress continued the practice.109 This timeline proved to be strong evidence
for the Court in Marsh that “the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion
Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a
violation of that Amendment.”110 For the most part, chaplains have served in the
House of Representatives and the Senate since the First Congress.111 Indeed,
when litigation in Marsh began in 1980, “[t]he Legislature of each of the fifty
States and of the Federal Government [began] each day with an opening
prayer.”112
Prior to Marsh, the Court recognized that “there are many manifestations in
our public life of belief in God” that do not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.113 Justice Jackson put it aptly:

108
On the Continental Congress’s second meeting day, the delegates resolved to open the following day’s
session with a prayer, despite dissent from delegates Jay and Rutledge. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 26 n.1 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Gov’t Printing Off. 1904) (1774).
Accordingly, on September 6, 1774, Anglican Reverend Duch gave a prayer, which delegate Samuel Ward of
Rhode Island described as “one of the most sublime, catholic, well-adapted prayers I ever heard.” Id. at 27 n.1.
Reverend Duch opened other sessions of the Continental Congress, was eventually appointed the official
chaplain and required to attend sessions daily, and was compensated “for the devout and acceptable manner in
which he discharged his duty during the time he officiated as chaplain.” 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 13 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Gov’t Printing Off. 1905) (1775); 5 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 530 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Gov’t Printing Off. 1906)
(1776); 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 887 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
Gov’t Printing Off. 1906) (1776).
109
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate elected their first chaplains during the First Congress.
H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1789); S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1789). A statute was
subsequently passed on September 22, 1789, providing payment for the chaplains. CONG. JOURNAL, 1st Cong.,
1st Sess. 71 (1789). Three days later, on September 25, the text of the First Amendment was finalized and
submitted for ratification to the states. JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 81 (4th ed. 2016).
110
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
111
See IDA A. BRUDNICK, HOUSE AND SENATE CHAPLAINS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2011), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41807.
112
Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Mass. 1979).
113
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (noting that requiring students to read historical texts
and study works with religious references may be fine as “[s]uch patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true
resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State . . . has sponsored”); see also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (“Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and
state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”).
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Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or
painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and
incomplete, even from a secular point of view. . . . The fact is that, for
good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting,
everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious
influences.114

The prevalence of religious influence in our history and culture means it
practically cannot, and perhaps properly should not, be eradicated from all facets
of our public life.115 The trouble, however, is determining where
acknowledgement of religion turns from benign recognition to endorsement,
advancement, and establishment.116
2. The Legislative Prayer Doctrine and Marsh v. Chambers
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court upheld the Nebraska unicameral
legislature’s traditional practice of appointing a chaplain to “attend and . . . open
with prayer each day’s sitting of the Legislature.”117 At the time suit was filed,
the chaplain for the Nebraska legislature had been in his role for sixteen years
and was paid $319.75 out of the general state funds “for each month the
legislature [was] in session.”118 In certain years, copies of select prayers were
compiled into a book and printed at the expense of the state.119 State Senator
Ernest Chambers filed suit against Frank Marsh, the State Treasurer of
Nebraska, alleging this practice violated the Establishment Clause.120
The Court began by emphatically stating that legislative prayer is “deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”121 Indeed, the practice
114

McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 (“Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“No significant segment of
our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other
parts, much less from government.”); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religion Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973) (“It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation . . . .”); see
also Colo, 392 N.E.2d at 1201 (“The complete obliteration of all vestiges of religious tradition from our public
life is unnecessary to carry out the goals of non-establishment and religious freedom set forth in our State and
Federal Constitutions.”).
116
See Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 587 (D. Neb. 1980) (“The turmoil over the proper interplay
between government and religion in America antedates the Constitution and has been continual throughout the
Republic’s history. . . . When the spheres have overlapped, sparks have often flown.”).
117
Id. at 586.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). But see Nicholas C. Roberts, The Rising None: Marsh,
Galloway, and the End of Legislative Prayer, 90 IND. L.J. 407, 412 (2015) (arguing the history recounted by the
115
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has existed since the Founding without overwhelming the “principles of
disestablishment and religious freedom.”122 The First Congress that crafted the
First Amendment in 1789 also hired two chaplains at taxpayer expense to
continue the Continental Congress’s practice of opening each session with
prayers.123 Indeed, the “actions [of the Founders] reveal their intent” that
legislative prayer does not threaten an establishment of religion.124
Further, the Court found it important that the legislative prayer was offered
to adults who are not “readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination.’”125 As to
the concerns of the lower courts regarding the longevity of the one-denomination
chaplain and the use of public funds to publish his prayers,126 the Supreme Court
answered only by stating that the historical background of legislative prayer was
enough to outweigh those concerns.127 According to the Court, so long as “there
is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief,” the Establishment
Clause is satisfied.128 The Court concluded that the “unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years” leaves no doubt that legislative prayer “has
become part of the fabric of our society” and is merely a “tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country,” rather
than a fateful step towards the establishment of religion.129
Perplexed by Chief Justice Burger’s undermining of the three-part test he
had crafted just over a decade earlier in Lemon, Justice Brennan dissented,
concluding that Marsh must be “carving out an exception to the Establishment
Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate
legislative prayer.” 130 The practice simply could not be upheld under any of the
three prongs of Lemon.131 Indeed, despite having written in Lemon that “[e]very
Court in Marsh is skewed and does not present the full historical landscape).
122
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
123
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
124
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
125
Id. at 792 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)).
126
Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1982). Important to the court was the fact that one
minister of one faith had given the invocation for almost two decades, demonstrating that the practice advanced
and gave preference to only one religious viewpoint. Id. However, the court refused to hold that “invocations
alone are unconstitutional,” hypothesizing that even paid chaplains may not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 235.
127
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
128
Id. at 794–95.
129
Id. at 792.
130
Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme
Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 906 (1987) (“By the mid-1980’s, with Chief
Justice Burger spearheading the attack, this three-part test appeared headed for obsolescence.”).
131
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796–99.
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analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years,”132 the Chief Justice made no reference
to his unifying Establishment Clause theory, instead relying on history alone to
uphold the Nebraska legislature’s practice.133
The Marsh Court left much uncertain. When are history and tradition enough
to forgo the Lemon analysis? Is this analysis limited only to the unique situation
of legislative prayer?134 Does the sectarian content of the prayer matter? In
failing to provide a coherent analysis rooted in precedent, the Court opened the
door for speculation and discretion as to when and where Marsh’s logic might
apply.
3. Allegheny Refines Marsh
Six years after Marsh, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, the Court sought to clarify its approach to the constitutionality of
religious ceremonies and symbols in public settings.135 At issue was a crèche
(Nativity display) located in the Allegheny County Courthouse and a Chanukah
Menorah at the City-Council Building.136 The crèche sat near the prominent
grand staircase, included traditional figures associated with the birth of Jesus
Christ, and was surrounded by poinsettias137 and an evergreen tree topped with
an angel bearing the phrase, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo!”138 Meanwhile, the
Chanukah Menorah sat next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree outside at a
secondary entrance to the courthouse campus.139 The ACLU filed suit, seeking
to enjoin the county from displaying both the crèche and the Chanukah
Menorah.140
In a fractured opinion that produced four separate concurrences, the Court
upheld the display of the Menorah but ruled that the crèche violated the
Establishment Clause.141 Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun refused to
apply the low “proselytizing” standard set in Marsh,142 instead opting for an
132

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790–94.
134
See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for church property
partially because it was an “unbroken practice”).
135
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
136
Id. at 580, 582.
137
Poinsettias are red and green flowers traditionally associated with Christianity.
138
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580.
139
Id. at 587.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 578–79.
142
Id. at 608; see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (“[T]here is no indication that the
133
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endorsement test based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly.143
To the plurality, the Chanukah Menorah and Christmas tree were merely
representative symbols associated with the holiday season, “which [have]
attained a secular status in our society.”144 Conversely, the prominent crèche was
deemed to “demonstrat[e] the government’s endorsement of Christian faith” by
promoting religious communication through a specific creed.145 Justice
Blackmun refused to apply Marsh, arguing that legislative prayer was the
exception because of its “unique history.”146 Curiously, Justice Blackmun cited
a footnote from Marsh147 as proof of its limited application, arguing that the
Nebraska prayer practice was only constitutional because the chaplain had
“removed all references to Christ” and was more general, whereas the crèche
was a symbol specifically associated with Christianity.148
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy derided the plurality’s hairsplitting,
contending that neither of the displays posed any real threat of coercion or
establishment of religion.149 Instead, he believed that “the Establishment Clause
permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the
central role religion plays in society.”150 Indeed, “[a]ny approach less sensitive
to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward religion.”151 Absent the
risk of proselytizing, government accommodation for religion that is “passive
and symbolic” hardly infringes on religious liberty, even where one specific faith
is spotlighted.152

prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.”).
143
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (“The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’” (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
144
Id. at 616.
145
Id. at 612.
146
Id. at 603 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791).
147
Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14 (“[The chaplain] characterizes his prayers as ‘nonsectarian,’
‘Judeo Christian,’ and with ‘elements of the American civil religion.’ Although some of his earlier prayers were
often explicitly Christian, [the chaplain] removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish
legislator.” (citations omitted))).
148
Id. at 603.
149
Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
150
Id. at 657.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 662.
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Justice Kennedy advocated for a much broader reading of Marsh as a rule
rather than an exception, arguing that the boundaries of the Establishment Clause
should be “determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings.”153 To do otherwise would be to require “[o]bsessive,
implacable resistance to all but the most carefully scripted and secularized” and
cast the Court in the role of secular arbiter.154 Under Justice Kennedy’s lenient
proselytization standard derived from Marsh,155 acts and symbols that may be
sectarian are not problematic, even if they retain their religious significance, so
long as they present no realistic risk of proselytizing or coercing citizens to
adhere to a particular faith or creed.156 While only a dissent in this case, Justice
Kennedy’s approach would become increasingly prevalent and capture a
majority of the Court in the coming decades.157
4. Lower Courts Found Harmony in Precluding Marsh in Non-Legislative
Settings
It is notable that no federal court of appeals upheld a practice under the
principles of Marsh outside of the setting of prayer in a legislature.158 Whether
it was a county judge opening court with prayer,159 a supper prayer read in front
of cadets at a public military institution,160 religious monuments,161 longstanding
153
Id. at 669, 670 (“I take it as settled law that, whatever standard the Court applies to Establishment
Clause claims, it must at least suggest results consistent with our precedents and the historical practices that, by
tradition, have informed our First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
154
Id. at 677–78.
155
Id. at 661, 664. Justice Kennedy argues that government speech about religion is not “per se suspect,”
and offers an example of a year-round display that would violate his standard and “place the government’s
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.” Id. at 661. However, unlike the
example, the displays at issue here did not “represent an effort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step down
the road to an establishment of religion.” Id. at 664.
156
Id. at 662.
157
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (“Simply having religious content or promoting
a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”); Town of Greece
v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (finding that “exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear
and in which they need not participate” does not constitute coercion); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139
S. Ct. 2067, 2093 (2019) (“[D]isplaying religious memorials . . . on public land is not coercive and is rooted in
history and tradition.”).
158
See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n the more than twenty years
since Marsh, the Court has never found its analysis applicable to any other circumstances; rather, the Court has
twice specifically refused to extend the Marsh approach to other situations. Similarly, we and our sister circuits
have steadfastly refused to extend Marsh.” (citations omitted)).
159
N.C. C.L. Union v. Constangy, 751 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d sub nom. N.C. C.L.
Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (“There is no evidence in this case of any such
200 year-old ‘unambiguous and unbroken history.’”).
160
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 369–71 (4th Cir. 2003).
161
Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding Marsh to be an “exception to
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state holidays,162 or prayer at a school board meeting,163 the exclusively
historical analysis of Marsh without the application of any other Establishment
Clause test was deemed inapplicable to other situations. One court even refused
to apply Marsh to legislative prayer that was not longstanding, demonstrating
the consensus regarding Marsh’s limited applicability.164
Lower courts limited Marsh for two main reasons. First, courts saw Marsh
as applicable only in the narrow context of legislative prayer,165 emphasizing
Allegheny’s characterization that Marsh does not stand for the proposition that
“all accepted practices 200 years old and their equivalents are constitutional
today.”166 Second, Marsh was based on a specifically longstanding and unique
history, and few other acts or practices have a similar pedigree to justify
removing them from traditional Establishment Clause analysis.167 These factors
led courts to recognize Marsh’s validity but not to impermissibly expand its
function.168
5. The Turn Towards History in Van Orden v. Perry
Even before Marsh, the Court insisted that religion “has been closely
identified with our history and government” and holds an exalted place in our
society.169 Although church and state are generally thought to be separate, “the
normal Establishment Clause jurisprudence” and refusing to apply its logic to a granite monument of the ten
commandments).
162
Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We are reluctant to extend a ruling explicitly
based upon the ‘unique history’ surrounding legislative prayer to such a different factual setting.” (citations
omitted)).
163
See Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Indian
River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2011).
164
Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 930 (Utah 1993) (refusing to apply Marsh
because the city council meetings at issue involved greater public participation and the prayer practice was not
observed from 1911 to 1979).
165
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 369–71; see also Card, 520 F.3d at 1014 (“Marsh is a narrow opinion that should
be construed as carving out an exception to normal Establishment Clause jurisprudence due to the ‘unique
history’ of legislative prayer.”).
166
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
167
E.g., Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370 (“In fact, public universities and military colleges, such as VMI, did not
exist when the Bill of Rights was adopted. We are therefore unable to apply Marsh’s reasoning to the evaluation
of the constitutionality of the supper prayer.” (citations omitted)).
168
See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Although the Court relied
solely—and to the exclusion of its traditional establishment tests—on a historical analysis to justify the practice
of legislative prayers in Marsh, since that decision the Court has repeatedly avoided applying Marsh’s mode of
historical analysis.”); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n the more than
twenty years since Marsh, the Court has never found its analysis applicable to any other circumstances; rather,
the Court has twice specifically refused to extend the Marsh approach to other situations. Similarly, we and our
sister circuits have steadfastly refused to extend Marsh.” (citations omitted)).
169
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343
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Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the public
sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious.”170 While Marsh marks the
first time the Court relied on history alone to uphold a practice, the Court has
acknowledged the role of religion in American public life since the Founding.171
Indeed, American history, often cited by the Court, is replete with examples of
constitutional religious acknowledgment in the executive,172 legislative,173 and
judicial174 branches, local municipalities,175 celebrated historical documents,176
U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”).
170
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (noting that requiring students to read historical texts and study works with religious
references may be fine as “[s]uch patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned
religious exercise that the State . . . has sponsored”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (“Our prior
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable.”); Engel, 370 U.S. at
446 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing the fears of sixteenth-century England are less relevant than the “history
of the religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our
government”).
171
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (“There is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789.”).
172
See id. at 677 (recounting the history of Presidents proclaiming a National Day of Prayer); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recounting the religious references in almost
every Presidential inaugural address as well as the “tradition of Thanksgiving Proclamations—with their
religious themes of prayerful gratitude to God—[which] has been adhered to by almost every President”); Engel,
370 U.S. at 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Each of our Presidents, from George Washington to John F.
Kennedy, has upon assuming his Office asked the protection and help of God.”); see also, e.g., Abraham Lincoln,
U.S. President, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in AMERICAN ORATIONS: STUDIES IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY, 125, 127–128 (Alexander Johnston & James A. Woodburn eds., 1898) (“Both read the same
Bible, and pray to the same God . . . . The Almighty has His own purposes . . . . With malice toward none, with
charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right . . . .”); Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President,
The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in AMERICAN ORATIONS at 123, 124 (“[T]his nation, under God, shall
have a new birth of freedom . . . .”); Letter from Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, to Lydia Bixby (Nov. 21,
1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HIS BOOKS 69 (William E. Barton, 1920) (“I pray that our Heavenly Father
may assuage the anguish of your bereavement . . . .”).
173
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (“The opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”); see also
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (“Congress has long provided chapels in the Capitol for religious worship and
meditation.”).
174
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court’s own sessions have opened with the
invocation ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court’ since the days of Chief Justice Marshall.”);
see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (“The very chamber in which oral arguments on this case were heard is decorated
with a notable and permanent—not seasonal—symbol of religion: Moses with Ten Commandments.”); Van
Orden, 545 U.S. at 688 (noting that depictions of the Ten Commandments adorn the south frieze, east façade,
and metal gates of the Supreme Court building, as well as the doors of the Courtroom).
175
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591 (2014) (describing the Town of Greece’s
ceremonial prayer as “a recognition that, since this Nation was founded and until the present day, many
Americans deem that their own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond the authority of government
to alter or define”).
176
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 6 (U.S. 1776) (referencing the “equal station to
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government landmarks,177 and other practices associated with American
tradition and culture.178
In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court began to turn towards Marsh’s historical
analysis, relying on a record of religious acknowledgment to uphold a monolith
of the Ten Commandments located on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.179
Similar to Marsh, the Court found the Lemon test “not useful in dealing with the
sort of passive monument” at issue.180 Instead, the Court relied on the “role the
Decalogue plays in America’s heritage,” along with the history of government
acknowledgment of religion to find the display constitutional.181 The emphasis
the Court placed on history in its Establishment Clause analysis directly echoed
Kennedy’s dissent in Allegheny County and signaled how the Court might
approach future Establishment Clause cases.
6. Embracing Marsh and History in Town of Greece v. Galloway
In the 2014 case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kennedy’s
approach in his Allegheny dissent carried the majority of the Court in upholding
prayers at town council meetings.182 Prior to 1999, the town of Greece, New
York, opened each of its town board meetings with a moment of silence.183
However, at the turn of the millennium, “the town began inviting local clergy to
offer . . . prayers[s]” right after the Board’s recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance.184 While the town did not have a formal policy governing or
which . . . Nature’s God” entitles people and calling for the “protection of divine Providence”); Emancipation
Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) (“I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty
God.”).
177
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 (“Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of
the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith.”); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (noting
that in the U.S. Capitol building and other government buildings, there are multiple religious statutes and
references).
178
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 (detailing the religious references in our national motto (“In God We Trust”)
and pledge of allegiance (“One nation under God”)); see also CNBC Television, Invocation Delivered at Joe
Biden’s Inauguration, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAaPkCpGBAk (“Gracious and
merciful God, at this sacred time we come before you in need.”).
179
Van Orden, 545 U.S at 681–82.
180
Id. at 686; see also id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting “this Court’s other tests” cannot “readily
explain the Establishment Clause’s tolerance . . . of the prayers that open legislative meetings,” invocations of
“the Deity in the public words of public officials,” nor “the public references to God on coins, decrees, and
buildings.”).
181
Id. at 686–90 (majority opinion).
182
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (“[T]he Establishment Clause must be
interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’” (quoting County of Alleghey v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1969))).
183
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012).
184
Id.
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restricting the prayers, between 1999 and 2010 nearly all the prayers were by
Christian clergy,185 and often in overtly religious terms.186 Plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that the prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause because the
“persistently sectarian—and almost exclusively Christian—prayers” had the
effect of aligning the town with the Christian faith.187
The Supreme Court, led by Justice Kennedy, reversed the Second Circuit’s
holding, finding that the prayer practice was constitutional.188 Following Marsh,
Justice Kennedy ignored Lemon and other Establishment Clause tests189 and
upheld the town council prayers in light of the history and tradition of legislative
prayer.190 For Kennedy, Marsh stands for the proposition that the Establishment
Clause must be understood “by reference to historical practices and
understandings.”191 Under this analysis, prayer offered to a legislature does not
need to be “nonsectarian or ecumenical,”192 contrary to Justice Blackmun’s
interpretation of Marsh in Allegheny County.193 Government need not act as
“censors of religious speech,” nor “mandate a civic religion that stifles any but
the most generic reference to the sacred any more than it may prescribe a
religious orthodoxy.”194
Further, the Court found that the town council prayers carried little risk of
coercion. The prayer was meant primarily for the lawmakers, similar to
Marsh.195 Moreover, the audience who might overhear the prayers consisted
mostly of adults who “can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial prayer
185
Id. Although the town invited a few non-Christians to deliver the prayer in 2008, the speakers were
once again entirely Christian after the record for litigation was closed in 2009. Id. Prior to 2008, the chaplain list
kept by the town Board “contained only Christian organizations and clergy.” Id. at 24.
186
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Blessed are you Lord, God
of all creation, whose goodness fills our hearts with joy. . . . Strengthen us with your grace and wisdom, for you
are God forever and ever. May the Lord bless you and keep you.”).
187
Id. at 209.
188
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014).
189
Id. at 575 (“The Court in Marsh found those tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion
that legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.”); see also WITTE & NICHOLS, supra
note 109, at 159 tbl.8.1 (mapping the plethora of Establishment Clause approaches employed by the Court).
190
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (“As practiced by Congress since the framing of the Constitution,
legislative prayer lends gravity to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit
of a higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”).
191
Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgement in part and dissenting in part)).
192
Id. at 578, 580 (“Marsh nowhere suggested that the constitutionality of legislative prayer turns on the
neutrality of its content.”).
193
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (arguing the Court in Marsh only found the Nebraska chaplain’s
prayer constitutional because most sectarian content had been removed).
194
Id. at 581.
195
Id. at 583.
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delivered by a person of a different faith,” unlike public school children.196
Ultimately, the only constraint on legislative prayer that the Court offered would
be present if the “practice over time shows that the invocations denigrate
nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion .
. . [and does not] elevate the purpose of the occasion,” even if the practice has a
longstanding history.197 For only the second time since Marsh, the Court relied
on the history and tradition of a practice alone to uphold it. However, the Court
did not explain when history alone justifies a practice or what it means for the
future of other Establishment Clause tests. That task was again left to the lower
courts.
7. Pure Historical Analysis Still Limited to the Legislative Setting
Since Town of Greece, lower courts have mainly disputed how sectarian a
legislative prayer or prayer giver may be.198 However, similar to the decisions
following Marsh, lower courts have mostly abstained from applying this purely
historical approach to settings outside of the legislative session for lack of the
uniquely longstanding history of legislative prayer.199 Even as courts begin to
grapple with the purely historical approach and presumption of constitutionality

196
Id. at 584; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (arguing because the “prayers bore the
imprint of the State,” they “put school-age children who objected in an untenable position”); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (holding, as in Lee, “the ‘degree of school involvement’ makes it
clear that the pregame prayers bear ‘the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an
untenable position’” (citations omitted)).
197
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 583.
198
Compare Fields v. Speaker of Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that the legislature’s
policy of only allowing theistic speakers to offer prayer is permissible), and Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870
F.3d 494, 497–98 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding a practice in which county commissioners delivered prayer on a
rotating basis, often in sectarian terms, after finding support in history and tradition), with Lund v. Rowan
County, 863 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2017) (refusing to purely apply Town of Greece to the town Board’s prayer
policy because board members were the prayer-givers, making it “elbow-deep in the activities banned by the
Establishment Clause—selecting and prescribing sectarian prayers”).
199
See Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132,
1143 (9th Cir. 2018) (refusing to apply the purely historical approach to the School Board’s prayer policy and
instead applying Lemon); Devaney v. Kilmartin, 88 F. Supp. 3d 34, 50 (D.R.I. 2015) (refusing to uphold the
ringing of church bells under Town of Greece based solely on history and tradition); Smith v. Jefferson Cnty.
Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the endorsement test to the school district’s
contract with a religious school because “the pure historical approach is of limited utility” and thus finding Town
of Greece inapplicable). But see Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding
the school district’s invocation policy under Town of Greece as legislative prayer); Woodring v. Jackson County,
986 F.3d 979, 995 (7th Cir. 2021) (using the purely historical approach from Town of Greece even after
determining that American Legion’s presumption of constitutionality did not apply); Freedom From Religion
Found. v. Mack, 4 F.4th 306, 315–17 (5th Cir. 2021) (issuing a stay of the district court’s order, which applied
Lemon to strike down a judge’s use of a chaplain to open court proceedings, arguing that Town of Greece was
more applicable).
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for longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices prescribed in American
Legion,200 many, if not most, Establishment Clause cases, such as those
involving school board prayer discussed below, lack such a decisive history or
established pedigree to be upheld by history alone.
As demonstrated recently in American Legion, the Court has indicated it is
ready to eschew traditional tests in favor of an approach that considers, at least
in part, history and tradition.201 Town of Greece should not be directly transposed
onto other settings because legislative prayer has a unique pedigree which spares
it from traditional Establishment Clause analysis. Additionally, as argued below,
when and how American Legion’s “presumption of constitutionality for
monuments, symbols, and practices” with a longstanding history applies is far
from clear.202 Regardless, the undeniable command from the Court is that “the
Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices
and understandings.’”203 Indeed, consideration of history, while not necessarily
the sole criterion, is undoubtedly an essential factor in any Establishment Clause
analysis moving forward.
II. SCHOOL BOARD PRAYER
Litigation surrounding school board prayer since Marsh has left lower courts
vexed. On the one hand, the function and organization of the public school board
is similar to a meeting of the legislature where prayer is constitutional. On the
other hand, the public school board is deeply intertwined with the school day
and students regularly attend meetings, implicating the precedent of
unconstitutionally coercive school prayer set out in Lee and Santa Fe. These
200
See Woodring, 986 F.3d at 996 (upholding the display of a nativity scene because it fit within historical
tradition); Freedom From Religion Found. v. County of Lehigh, 933 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding
the county’s seal containing Christian imagery because it fit “comfortably within a long tradition”); Kondrat’yev
v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1331 (11th Cir. 2020) (upholding the Bayview Park cross after concluding
that it was an “established” monument, thus qualifying for American Legion’s presumption of constitutionality);
Perrier-Bilbo v. United States, 954 F.3d 413, 426 (1st Cir. 2020) (upholding the use of “so help me God” in a
naturalization oath).
201
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“While the
Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause, . . . we have
taken a more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance.”);
id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (arguing “[i]f the challenged government practice is not coercive and if
it . . . is rooted in history and tradition,” then the practice is constitutional); see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984) (“In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.”).
202
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082 (plurality opinion); id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
judgement) (“How old must a monument, symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption?”).
203
Id. at 2087 (plurality opinion) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)); see
also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (“The Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause has comported with what
history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees.”).
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conflicting doctrines have resulted in divergent lower court approaches
attempting to fit the school board prayer context into either one of these preexisting frameworks.
In section A, this Part will first detail the early, divergent school board prayer
cases. Section B will detail the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of traditional tests and
application of Marsh and Town of Greece’s purely historical approach for
legislative prayer to uphold the school board prayer practice in American
Humanist Association v. McCarty. Finally, section C will discuss the Ninth
Circuit’s rejection of Marsh and use of coercion analysis paired with the Lemon
test in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chino Valley Unified School
District.
A. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Early School Board Prayer Cases
Prayers and clerical involvement in local school board meetings date back
to the early nineteenth century in at least eight different states.204 But it was not
until 1999 that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate
court to address an Establishment Clause challenge to this practice. At issue in
Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education was the prayer policy permitting
meetings of the Cleveland Board of Education to be opened with prayer.205 The
Board met on school property and encouraged students and parents to attend so
as to “voice their concerns . . . over a wide range of topics related to the operation
204

McCarty, 851 F.3d at 527. In her article, Prayer is Prologue, Marie Elizabeth Wicks details this history:
In Pennsylvania, minutes of public-school board meetings from 1820 contain the texts of the
invocations delivered. In Massachusetts, the Common School Journal for the year 1842 explained
that public school boards in Massachusetts could have clergymen as members. The Journal of
the Board of Education of the State of Iowa contains several references to invocations delivered
during school board sessions in the year 1859, as well as the names of the pastors who delivered
them. In A History of Public Schools in North Carolina, the author notes that each year delegates
were chosen from each school board to attend the statewide delegation in 1859, and a large
portion of the delegates were “ministers of the gospel.” In Wisconsin, minutes from board
meetings dating back to 1857 denote opening prayers, as well as the names of the reverends that
delivered them, including some members of the board themselves.

Marie Elizabeth Wicks, Prayer is Prologue: The Impact of Town of Greece on the Constitutionality of
Deliberative Public Body Prayer at the Start of School Board Meetings, 31 J.L. & POL. 1, 30–31 (2015).
Historical accounts from Missouri, Michigan, and New York provide less direct evidence of school-board prayer,
but rather a willingness of the school board to involve local clergy. See Brief for Family Research Council &
Louisiana Family Forum as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants at 9–11, Doe v. Tangipahoa Par.
Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-30294). But see Andrew L. Seidel, Bad History, Bad Opinions:
How “Law Office History” is Leading the Courts Astray on School Board Prayer and the First Amendment, 12
NE. U.L. REV. 248, 269 (2020) (arguing that the history relied on by the Fifth Circuit and Ms. Wicks “crumbles
under scrutiny”).
205
171 F.3d 369, 372–73 (6th Cir. 1999).
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of the public school system.”206 A student representative served on the Board,
students were routinely invited to accept awards and receive recognition, and, in
some cases, students were required to address the Board in disciplinary
actions.207 In 1992, the Board decided to open its public meetings with prayer
from either a “local religious community chosen by the school board president,
a moment of silent prayer, or a prayer led by the school board president
himself.”208 These prayers were often explicitly sectarian.209 Relying on the
“‘unbroken’ history of accepting public prayer,” the district court upheld the
policy, arguing that these meetings fall under Marsh as adult legislative meetings
rather than the student-centered gatherings at issue in Lee or Santa Fe.210
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit prophetically stated that the case put them
“squarely between the proverbial rock and a hard place.”211 Indeed, the court
acknowledged that school board prayer does “not neatly fit within the category”
of either school-sponsored prayer or legislative prayer.212 Despite this, the court
reasoned that the school board is more similar to the class of activities governed
by the Court’s school prayer cases because it is “inextricably intertwined with
the public school system,” rather than the legislative setting.213 Eschewing
Marsh, the court comprehensively identified several factors—such as the
integral part the board plays in the operation of the public school, the board’s
function of serving students who have a “heightened interest in . . . participation
in” the meetings, and the setting, which is arguably more coercive than the
graduation ceremony in Lee—to place this case closer to school prayer.214
Ultimately, the court chose to apply the Lemon test and found the practice
unconstitutional.215
Confronted with this difficult task of categorizing school board prayer, other
appellate courts before the 2014 Town of Greece case chose to fall back on
Allegheny and strike down the school board prayer policies that resulted in
206

Id. at 372.
Id.
208
Id. at 373.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 375.
211
Id. at 371. The rock is Lee and coercive school prayer whereas the hard place is Marsh and legislative
prayer. Id.
212
Id. at 376.
213
Id. at 377 (describing Marsh and legislative prayer as the “historical exception to the mainstream”).
214
Id. at 381–83. The court notes that students are the focus of meetings and that the Board serves as the
students’ only avenue for voicing concerns regarding their education. Id. at 382. Whereas graduation ceremonies
mark “the end of a student’s association with a school,” here the students are “a far more captive audience” and
students may want to attend for a variety of reasons. Id. at 383.
215
Id. at 385.
207
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sectarian prayer. The Ninth Circuit confronted the issue in Bacus v. Palo Verde
Unified School District.216 The school board prayers that took place regularly
were almost always given “in the Name of Jesus.”217 Although the court
recognized that the issue did not fit cleanly into a pre-existing analytical
framework, the court found the prayers too sectarian to be upheld even under
Marsh’s more lenient standard and refused to decide whether the situation was
more similar to legislative prayer or a classroom prayer.218
The Fifth Circuit charted a similar course in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish
School Board.219 Since 1973, the Tangipahoa School Board allowed boardapproved individuals to offer prayers at their meetings following the Pledge of
Allegiance.220 The court assumed arguendo that the School Board fell under
Marsh, but, similar to the Ninth Circuit, found the prayers to be sectarian and
thus unconstitutional regardless of Marsh’s applicability.221 Although
overturned later for lack of standing,222 this case, along with Bacus,
demonstrates that lower courts rely on circuit jurisprudence regarding sectarian
prayer, guided by the Court’s decision in Allegheny, to avoid the difficult task
of categorizing school board prayer.
In Doe v. Indian River School District, the Third Circuit addressed the Indian
River School District practice of allowing prayer at its board meetings, a practice
which began in 1969 and was formalized in 2004.223 The prayers, which “nearly
always—and exclusively—refer[red] to Christian concepts,”224 were given by
board members on a rotating basis and followed the presentation of the colors.225
Concluding that Marsh was more applicable, the district court upheld the
policy.226

216

52 F. App’x 355, 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 356.
218
Id.
219
473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006).
220
Id. at 192.
221
Id. at 202–05 (“Because the Board’s prayers in the stipulations demonstrate a clear preference for
Christianity, they are not permitted under Marsh.”).
222
Doe v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2007) (rehearing en banc).
223
Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2011).
224
Id. at 265.
225
Id. at 262.
226
Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 685 F. Supp. 2d 524, 539 (D. Del. 2010) (“In sum, a school board does
not implicate the same concerns as the coercive effect of classroom prayers, graduation prayers, or prayers during
extracurricular activities . . . .”).
217
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In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit rejected the notion that
coercion was not a concern in the school board setting.227 Similar to Lee and
Santa Fe, attendance at the board meetings was not mandatory.228 However,
student attendance was still meaningful in many ways, and students likely faced
peer pressure to attend or otherwise risked losing benefits and recognition.229
According to the court, Lee captured these concerns more accurately than Marsh
because “the entire purpose and structure of the Indian River School Board
revolve[d] around public school education.”230 Further, Marsh was predicated
on the unique history of legislative prayer, and courts since have “proven
reluctant to extend Marsh outside of its narrow historical context.”231 The court
went on to invalidate the policy under the Lemon and endorsement tests.232
While the Third and Sixth Circuits chose where the school board fit into
existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
refused to do so by relying on the sectarian nature of the prayer and Allegheny
to invalidate the polices. However, Town of Greece—which overturned
Allegheny’s sectarian standard—would remove this safety valve for courts,
forcing them to squarely decide where school board prayer fits in the
Establishment Clause framework.233 The circuit split that emerged after Town of
Greece demonstrates the difficulty for courts in fitting the school board into
either the school prayer or legislative prayer jurisprudential schemes.
B. The Fifth Circuit Expands Marsh to the School Board Setting
In American Humanist Association v. McCarty, the Fifth Circuit became the
first to address school board prayer following the Court’s overturning of
Allegheny and affirmation of the use of history in Establishment Clause analysis
in Town of Greece. At issue was the monthly public meetings of the Birdville
Independent School District.234 Beginning in 1997, the Board chose two students
based on merit to deliver the Pledge of Allegiance and, subsequently, an

227

Indian River, 653 F.3d at 275 (“Marsh does not adequately capture these concerns.”).
Id. at 276.
229
Id. at 277. A student may attend to celebrate academic success with family, extracurricular success
with their team, or simply to “comment on school policies or otherwise participate in the decision-making that
affects his or her education.” Id. at 276, 278, 279.
230
Id. at 278.
231
Id. at 281.
232
Id. at 283–90.
233
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 578–86 (2014). The Court upheld the prayer policy of
the town Board, concluding that it was similar enough to legislative prayer to be included in the historical
analysis of Marsh and that prayers under Marsh need not be non-sectarian. Id. at 590–92.
234
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2017).
228
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invocation, typically in the form of a prayer.235 Members of the Board and
audience typically stood for the Pledge and remained standing for the
invocation.236 In 2015, the Board changed the word “invocation” to a “student
expression” in its policy and began selecting from a list of volunteers to deliver
the message.237 The American Humanist Association, along with former student
Isaiah Smith, filed suit, alleging the policy amounted to an endorsement or
advancement of religion—specifically, Christianity.238 In support of this claim,
the complaint detailed years of instances of sectarian Christian prayer in the
presence of students.239
The district court upheld the policy, concluding that the “school board is
more like a legislature than a school classroom,” and thus Marsh governed.240
The court found that the policy should be governed by Town of Greece because
the prayer opportunity was not “used to proselytize or to disparage other . . .
beliefs,” and citizens attending were not coerced to participate.241
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court in a short, limited
opinion, concluding that the school board is a “deliberative body, charged with
overseeing . . . tasks that are undeniably legislative.”242 Although the court
acknowledged that students may be in attendance, the principal audience is
nonetheless the board members.243 Admitting that the history of school board
prayer is more limited than that of legislative prayer, the court still concluded
that Town of Greece and Marsh stand for a broader history of prayer at public
meetings.244 Even though students may attend the meetings, their presence did
not transform the nature of the meeting from one that was mainly legislative and
meant for adult members.245 The court distinguished its opinion from Coles and
Indian River—where the Sixth and Third Circuits declined to apply Marsh to
school board prayer—relying on the fact that those cases were decided prior to
Town of Greece.246
235

Id. at 524.
E.g., Feb 28, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38343.
237
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 524.
238
Complaint at 10, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:15-cv-377 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
1, 2016).
239
Id. at 6–9.
240
Am. Humanist Ass’n, No. 4:15-cv-377, at 5.
241
Id. at 6.
242
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 526.
243
Id. at 527.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 527–28.
246
Id. at 528.
236
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The Fifth Circuit took a bold step in upholding the school board’s prayer
policy solely under the broad guise of prayer at public meetings without
subjecting the practice to any further Establishment Clause scrutiny, especially
considering the limited factual and historical record relied on by the court.247 As
discussed above, no court before the Fifth Circuit in McCarty had extended the
legislative prayer doctrine to a setting outside of state and town government
meetings.248
C. The Ninth Circuit Chooses Lemon over Marsh
The Ninth Circuit in 2018 took a decidedly different approach in Freedom
From Religion Foundation v. Chino Valley Unified School District. At issue
were the school board meetings of the Chino Valley Unified School District.249
These meetings are held eighteen times per year to make policy decisions,
address various issues facing the district’s students and teachers, and celebrate
student achievement.250 Since at least 2010, the Board has opened its meetings
with the Pledge of Allegiance, a presentation of colors, and an opening prayer.251
Religious leaders in the community were randomly chosen from a list to give
the prayer.252 Often, a board member gave the opening prayer instead.253 Board
members frequently and explicitly invoked Christianity as a part of regular board
business.254 The Freedom From Religion Foundation filed suit to enjoin the
Board from conducting prayer at the meetings, alleging that the opening prayer
and regular conduct of the board members violated the Establishment Clause.255
The district court agreed, granting partial summary judgment.256
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, in light of Marsh and Town of
Greece, the School Board’s policy did not fit into the legislative prayer
exception to the Establishment Clause.257 The court stressed that legislative
prayer is a uniquely longstanding practice in the presence of citizens who “hold
equal status as adult members of the political community.”258 Conversely,
247

Id. at 527 (“School board prayer presumably does not date back to the Constitution’s adoption . . . .”).
See supra notes 158–65.
249
Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138
(9th Cir. 2018).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 1138–39.
252
Id. at 1139–40.
253
Id. at 1140.
254
Id. at 1140–41. This activity included preaching and reading Bible verses during the meetings. Id.
255
Id. at 1141.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 1145–46.
258
Id. at 1145–48.
248
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school boards “are not solely a venue for policymaking,” but rather an
“extension[] of the educational experience of the district’s public schools.”259
Unlike their adult counterparts, students who attend are controlled by school
officials and vulnerable to “peer pressure and other pressures to conform to
social norms and adult expectations.”260 Their presence is “integral to the
meeting: they perform for the Board . . . ; they receive awards; and one among
their number sits on the Board and participates in the Board’s deliberative
process.”261 Finding the Town of Greece historical approach inapposite, the
court applied the Lemon test to strike down the policy as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.262 However, similar to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
McCarty likening the school board to a legislature, here the opposite conclusion
of outright rejecting the Marsh/Town of Greece historical approach fails to
encapsulate the Supreme Court’s recent instruction. Instead, a new test is needed
that both captures the unique elements and concerns inherent in a school board
meeting and reflects recent Supreme Court precedent.
III. A NEW TEST FOR A NEW SETTING
Lower courts have undoubtedly struggled to find the school board’s place in
the panoply of existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This is because the
school board neither fits neatly into the school or legislative settings nor
completely embodies the concerns that particularly arise in those settings.
Consequently, attempts to categorize school board prayer either as the school
day or the legislative setting inevitably stretch the cases they rely upon to
illogical extents and result in unsatisfying analysis.263 Given the Court’s

259

Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1145–46.
261
Id. at 1146.
262
Id. at 1148–51.
263
See Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526–27 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding the school
board falls under the legislative prayer doctrine and the broader category of public prayer despite admitting the
history of school board prayer, the main factor identified by the Court that justifies eschewing traditional
Establishment Clause tests, is much more limited than that of legislative prayer). But see Tessa M. Bayly, Prayer,
Practice, Precedent and American School Board Meetings, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 173, 195 (2019) (arguing a school
board meeting is similar enough to the legislature to permit prayer practices under the legislative prayer
doctrine); Austin Reed, Constitutional Law—Where Does It Fit? Solving the School Board Prayer Puzzle, 43 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281, 300 (2020) (arguing school board prayer should be analyzed using legislative
prayer precedent rather than school prayer precedent); Claire Lee, The Practice of Prayer at the School Board
Meetings: The Coercion Test as a Framework to Determine the Constitutionality of School Board Prayer, 2020
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 367, 391 (2020) (arguing school board prayer is best analyzed under the coercion test and is
likewise unconstitutional); Kaitlyn Huelskamp, Lemons, Legislatures, and Liberties: The Constitutionality of
Prayer at the Public School Board Meeting, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 739, 764 (2021) (arguing not only should school
board prayer not fall under legislative prayer, but also that legislative prayer should be abandoned altogether).
260
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willingness to buck traditional Establishment Clause tests,264 a new test that
better encapsulates the unique setting and concerns inherent in the school board
setting is needed.265
Section A describes why neither of the approaches from Marsh nor Lee used
by lower courts is well-suited to the school board prayer context. Section B sets
out a balancing test—weighing history and coercion—that is better suited for
school board prayer. Finally, sections C and D apply this new test to the Ninth
and Fifth Circuit cases involved in the circuit split.
A. Neither Marsh nor Lee Provide an Appropriate Analytical Framework
Although these inquiries are fact-sensitive,266 the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
split demonstrates the difficulty of lower courts in grappling with the Court’s
ambiguous, blurred Establishment Clause jurisprudence.267 This difficulty arises
in part because these approaches are far from one size fits all or a grand unified
Establishment Clause theory.268 Rather, these modes of analysis function
properly within the circumstances they were decided in and are ill suited to apply
to every prayer context.
The legislative prayer doctrine in Marsh was crafted in light of the fact that
legislative prayer is “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country,” uniquely marked by an “unambiguous and unbroken history of more
than 200 years.”269 In Town of Greece, the Court logically recognized that town
meetings are similar to legislative settings.270 The prayers offered are for the
lawmakers and the risk of coercing mature adults is low.271 Both the minimal

264
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2093 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(“Today, the Court declines to apply Lemon in a case in the religious symbols and religious speech category,
just as the Court declined to apply Lemon in Town of Greece v. Galloway, Van Orden v. Perry, and Marsh v.
Chambers.”).
265
See id. (arguing “[i]f the challenged government practice is not coercive and if it . . . is rooted in history
and tradition,” then the practice is constitutional); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional
line in every case.”).
266
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014) (“The inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one
that considers both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”).
267
See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. Connellsville Area Sch. Dist., No. 2:12-cv-1406, 2013 WL
869663, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting four different Establishment Clause tests).
268
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (“While the Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand
unified theory of the Establishment Clause, in later cases, we have taken a more modest approach that focuses
on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance.”).
269
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786, 792 (1983).
270
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589–90.
271
Id. at 589.
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risk posed and the uniquely longstanding history dating back to the Founders
justify legislative prayer.
On the one hand, although the school board is similarly “composed of
publicly elected officials drawn from the local community, that is where the
similarity ends.”272 Unlike legislative prayer, school board prayer is not “deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”273 The school board is
“intertwined with the public school system,” is “uniquely directed toward
school-related matters,” and its constituency is the students rather than the adult
citizens served by the legislature.274 Students who serve as representatives, seek
disciplinary remedies, or wish to voice opinions to the board directly concerning
their education are obliged to attend. Students may also attend to accept awards
or be recognized for their extracurricular activities.275 While not strictly
mandatory, students face peer pressure to attend and forfeit intangible benefits
by non-attendance, making the optional nature of the meeting “formalistic in the
extreme.”276 Further, even the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the
“[i]nherent differences between the public school system and a session of a state
legislature,”277 concluding that mature adults, unlike children, may freely leave
without being subjected to “religious indoctrination or peer pressure.”278
Given these differences and the higher risk of coercion, school board prayer
cannot be justified solely by longstanding history as in Marsh or Town of
Greece. The Fifth Circuit’s decision to do so by simply declaring that school
board prayer falls under the broad umbrella of prayer at public meetings was
certainly questionable. Expanding the category of Establishment Clause actions,
justified by history alone and exempt from any real scrutiny to this spacious
extent, would severely hamper litigants who truly have injuries to press and
makes short work of claims that require deeper analysis. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine what practices would not be constitutional under the Fifth Circuit’s
approach.

272

Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999).
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
274
Coles, 171 F.3d at 377, 381; see Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2011)
(concluding the school board’s “entire purpose and structure . . . revolves around public school education” and
is “aimed at educating students or otherwise administering the public school system”).
275
Coles, 171 F.3d at 372.
276
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992).
277
Id. at 596.
278
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792); see also
Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995) (after a high school basketball coach led
his team in prayer, spectators asked a non-participating team member, “Aren’t you a Christian?” and a teacher
referred to the team member as a “little atheist”).
273
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Despite the Court’s recent pronouncement in American Legion of a
presumption of constitutionality for certain longstanding monuments, symbols,
and practices, much uncertainty exists regarding when and how such a
presumption applies.279 The factors identified by the Court to support
abandoning Lemon in favor of such a presumption in that case—that the passage
of time imbues a practice with familiarity and historical significance and that the
original purpose or meaning may be hard to decipher or may evolve over
time280—do not appear to be at issue in these school board prayer cases. Indeed,
as discussed above, school board prayer lacks the established history,
familiarity, and significance of legislative prayer, and is neither as continuously
longstanding nor imbued with quite as much contrary or substantive meaning as
the century old Maryland Peace Cross at issue in American Legion.281 Therefore,
this Comment assumes arguendo that this presumption of constitutionality does
not apply to school board prayer, but dares not ignore the Court’s more central
command to “look[] to history for guidance.”282
On the other hand, school boards do not involve the same level of coercive
danger present during the school day or other school-sponsored activities, such
as a graduation ceremony or football game. While the school board exists to
serve the students of its district, the meetings are not as student centered as other
activities considered by the Court. A pure coercion analysis, such as the one used
in Lee, fails to capture the unique setting of the school board, which is less
intimately associated with the school day than other school-sponsored events.
Student presence and involvement in the school board meeting is a central factor
but not a necessary one, as a school board meeting may occur without students,
unlike a graduation ceremony or football game. Although the subject matter
discussed at school board meetings inherently implicates students, and coercion
of those students deciding to attend must be considered, student presence should
not be the sole factor.

279
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2102 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“How
old must a monument, symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption?”); see also Woodring v.
Jackson County, 986 F.3d 979, 994 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e are unable to conclude, as a threshold matter, that the
County’s nativity scene is ‘longstanding’ or ‘established’ such that American Legion’s presumption could
attach.”).
280
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081–85 (majority opinion).
281
Id. at 2085–86 (noting the uncertainty over the cross’s original purpose if the purpose for its
maintenance changed over time and if the cross had “become a familiar part of the physical and cultural
landscape” to the point where its removal may be seen as hostile towards religion rather than neutral).
282
Id. at 2087; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“The Court’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause has comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its
guarantees.”).
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The test set out in Lemon is equally unavailing.283 At best, the test has been
called into question.284 At worst, it has been abandoned.285 The struggle to fit
school board prayer into the previously tailored frameworks of Town of Greece,
Lemon, and Lee speaks to the need of a new mode of analysis.286 Indeed, the
Court almost explicitly calls for fresh Establishment Clause evaluation.287
B. Balancing Coercion and History
The school board setting involves elements and concerns of both the school
day and the legislature. Therefore, this proposed test balances the coercive effect
of the prayer against the history and accepted tradition of the practice and our
tolerance of religious acknowledgment in public life.
As an initial matter, the coercive effect of the prayer will serve as the
threshold to balancing. Where a prayer practice is blatantly coercive, it need not
be balanced against the history and tradition of the practice and is likewise
unconstitutional.288 Coercion is the barrier to the test because the school board
is intertwined with the school day and is “uniquely directed toward schoolrelated matters.”289 The school board’s chief constituency is students and its
283
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (“If the Lemon Court thought that its test would provide a framework
for all future Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not been met. In many cases, this Court has
either expressly declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it.”).
284
Id. at 2081 (“The test has been harshly criticized by Members of this Court, lamented by lower court
judges, and questioned by a diverse roster of scholars.”).
285
See id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Today, the Court declines to apply Lemon in a case in
the religious symbols and religious speech category, just as the Court declined to apply Lemon in Town of Greece
v. Galloway, Van Orden v. Perry, and Marsh v. Chambers.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Although [Lemon] initially provided helpful assistance, we soon began describing
the test as only a ‘guideline.’” (citations omitted)); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Lemon test as a “formulaic abstraction” for which the Court “demonstrates the
irrelevance of . . . by essentially ignoring it”); see also Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1326
(11th Cir. 2020) (“Lemon is dead.”).
286
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Neither can this Court’s
other tests readily explain the Establishment Clause’s tolerance . . . of the prayers that open legislative meetings,
. . . invocations of . . . the Deity [by] public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings
. . . .”).
287
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (“The case teaches instead that the
Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’” (quoting
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989))); Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087
(“[W]e have taken a more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for
guidance.”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (“In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se, rule can
be framed.”); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has found no single mechanical
formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case.”).
288
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“Yet Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that
would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundations.”).
289
Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Lee, 505
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audience may include impressionable young people susceptible to peer pressure
and influence by government authorities, in contrast to adults who are better
equipped to resist subtle coercive state pressure.290
This coercive effect is understood by analyzing the government’s
involvement in the prayer, content, speaker, setting, the voluntary nature of
attendance for students, and the totality of circumstances surrounding the prayer
such as the order and process by which it occurs.291 This analysis uses Lee v.
Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe as guideposts to
determine whether a prayer practice is coercive enough to fail at the threshold.292
Where a prayer practice is not coercive enough to fail at the threshold, any
coercive elements will then be weighed against the tradition of the practice and
our history of religious acknowledgment in public spaces and by public
officials.293 History and tradition have been explicitly identified by the Court as
an essential component in Establishment Clause analysis.294 However,
upholding a practice based solely on history is a far more controversial and
exceptional matter. As explained above, although our history of religious
acknowledgment in public spaces is robust, school board prayer lacks the same
longstanding history or established pedigree of legislative prayer or other similar
practices.295
Therefore, the practice cannot be upheld by history alone under Town of
Greece, and this Comment assumes arguendo that it does not qualify for
U.S. at 592, 597 (noting the “obvious differences” between the school and legislative setting “where adults are
free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons,” and recognizing that concern about
coercion “may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there”); Town of Greece, 572
U.S. at 590 (noting the difference between the legislative setting and school setting, which includes objecting
students and supervision by school officials, and the town board meeting, which includes “mature adults who
‘presumably’ are ‘not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure’” (citations omitted)).
290
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (detailing the differences between the state legislative prayers upheld in Marsh
and the prayers that occurred at a school-sponsored event connected with the school day).
291
These factors are discussed in detail supra at Part.I.A.3.
292
See supra Part.I.A.2.
293
See supra notes 170–78 and accompanying text.
294
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference
to historical practices and understandings.’” (quoting County of Alleghey v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 670 (1969))); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plurality
opinion) (“While the Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified theory of the Establishment
Clause, in later cases, we have taken a more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and
looks to history for guidance.”); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (“[O]ur analysis is driven
both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)
(“The Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause has comported with what history reveals was the
contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees.”).
295
See supra note 204.

WATTS_12.15.21

314

12/16/2021 10:40 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:273

American Legion’s indeterminate and ambiguous presumption of
constitutionality for longstanding and established practices. Additionally, some
degree of coercion is presumed in the school board setting due to its entwined
relationship with the school and impressionable students.296 Accordingly, the
Court’s long line of school prayer precedent cannot be ignored, and history alone
cannot justify the practice.297 Instead, each must be considered and weighed
against the other.
The balancing here works like a sliding scale.298 The more coercive a
practice, the stronger a showing of longstanding history and tradition is required
to find it constitutional. Although a showing of longstanding history will be
enough to outweigh a practice that contains some coercive elements, the
threshold test prevents blatantly coercive practices from constitutionality simply
because they happen to have existed for a long period of time.299 This balance
follows Court precedent in which older displays and practices are more often
found constitutional because they have “become a part of American culture,
society, and democracy—and [are] thus unlikely to be a fateful first step toward
an establishment of religion.”300 Once the practice passes the threshold coercion
296
See Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s . . .
school prayer cases reveal . . . the need to protect students from government coercion in the form of endorsed or
sponsored religion . . . . Marsh does not adequately capture these concerns.”).
297
See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (arguing “[i]f the challenged
government practice is not coercive and if it . . . is rooted in history and tradition,” then the practice is
constitutional).
298
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (adopting a sliding
scale approach to determine personal jurisdiction in internet cases where the more commercial a website is the
more likely that the operator has “purposefully availed itself” of the forum state); Aparicio v. Christian Union,
Inc., 18-CV-0592 (ALC), 2019 WL 1437618, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (describing the sliding scale for
the ministerial exception, “in which ‘the more religious the employer institution is, the less religious the
employee’s functions must be to qualify’” as a minister (quoting Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp.
3d 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2016))).
299
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“Yet Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that
would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.”).
300
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 109, at 217; cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2007)
(explaining “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms” are not called into question by the ruling
that the Second Amendment is an individual right). Compare Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983)
(upholding legislative prayer based on the fact that “[f]rom colonial times through the founding of the Republic
and ever since” it has been “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country”), and Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[Forty] years passed in which the
presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged . . . .”), and Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078
(upholding maintenance by the city of a cross that had been erected for over ninety years), with Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (striking down a Kentucky statute requiring public school classrooms to post a copy of
the Ten Commandments, which was passed the same year litigation ensued), and McCreary County v. ACLU
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (striking down several courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments and
other biblical depictions, the earliest of which was erected only six years prior to litigation and the latest of which
was erected while litigation was ongoing).
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question, the elements of the prayer practice, including those that may be
somewhat or debatably coercive but not so flagrant as to fail at the threshold,
can be weighed and understood in light of history and tradition to determine its
constitutionality. With this framework in mind, the Ninth Circuit case of
Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chino Valley Unified School District
Board of Education and the Fifth Circuit case of American Humanist
Association v. McCarty will be analyzed in turn.
C. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified School
District
Since 2010, the Chino Valley Unified School District has opened the public
portion of its school board meetings with an invocation led by local clergy or
sometimes even a Board member.301 A student representative sits on the Board
and students are regularly in attendance because a student performance typically
follows the invocation.302 As explained below, this prayer policy is
unconstitutionally coercive and fails this Comment’s proposed Establishment
Clause test at the threshold.
1. Coercion Analysis
All factors to consider in a coercion analysis are present in this case. First,
the School Board here has control over the speaker and some control over the
message. The Board selects clergy from a list of eligible chaplains organized by
the superintendent.303 Although the Board’s official policy is not to control the
message of the speaker, there are times when this procedure has not been
followed.304 Additionally, in the absence of selected clergy at the meeting, a
Board member gives the opening prayer.305 Just as in Lee, where school officials
monitored and oversaw the speakers and prayer given,306 here the Board has
301
Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1139
(9th Cir. 2018).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
See id. at 1138 n.2.
305
Id. A review of the available Board minutes from 2012 shows that eighteen of the twenty-five
invocations given that year were by Board members or school officials rather than invited clergy. 2012 Board
of Education Agendas and Minutes, CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/Page/
17383 (last visited Nov. 10, 2021). In 2013, that number was seven of the nineteen invocations. 2013 Board of
Education Agendas and Minutes, CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/Page/17382
(last visited Nov. 10, 2021). In 2014, it was eight of the fifteen invocations. 2014 Board of Education Agendas
and Minutes, CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/Page/17381 (last visited Nov.
10, 2021).
306
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
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intertwined itself with the invocation and exercises some control over who may
speak and what type of message may be delivered.307
Aside from the inherently coercive setting of the school board meeting, here,
many students are either actually or practically obliged to attend. The Board has
a student representative present and active at all regular meetings.308 A student
showcase often follows the prayer and involves performances or other student
recognitions.309 Similar to the practically obligatory nature of the events in Lee
and Santa Fe, students invited to perform in front of their school community
with their peers encounter pressure to attend or face the threat of ostracism.310
To say that attendance is voluntary and that invited students who disagree with
the invocation need not come would be “formalistic in the extreme.”311
Additionally, the student member of the Board is obliged to attend by virtue of
her position and must sit through the invocation, which is often given by the
board members who sit and vote with her and with whom she is expected to
work alongside. This is also true for students who may be required to appear
before the Board for certain discipline and readmission cases or waiver requests
pertaining to high school graduation.312
The process by which the prayer occurs here is also coercive and gives little
opportunity for a non-participating student to avoid involvement without
dissenting in front of those assembled. The prayer comes near the beginning of
the meeting and is directly followed by the student showcase.313 To avoid the
invocation, a student involved in the student showcase must either arrive late or
leave and re-enter the room moments before performing in front of the Board.314
Otherwise, a non-participating student must firmly resist the pressure to pray
under the watchful eye of the Board.315
307
Indeed, a review of the available board minutes for 2012 shows that every invocation given by an
outside pastor was of the Christian faith. See 2012 Board of Education Agendas and Minutes, supra note 305.
In 2015, Christian pastors gave thirteen of the eighteen invocations. 2015 Board of Education Agendas and
Minutes, CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/Page/17380 (last visited Nov. 10,
2021).
308
Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at 1139.
309
Id.
310
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (holding that students, for all “practical purposes, are obliged to attend” the
graduation ceremony); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (holding that, although
football games are in some ways voluntary, students still feel “immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine
desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event”).
311
Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.
312
Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at 1138–39.
313
Id.
314
See Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. Videos, supra note 8 (showing a group of twenty-seven band
students come before the Board to perform immediately following the invocation at 3:20).
315
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (“[Coercion] concerns have particular application in the case of school
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Finally, a student attending a Chino Valley School Board meeting faces
immense pressure to conform and participate in the invocation. Through both
personal invocations and statements following invocations, board members have
made it clear that Christianity is the favored religion.316 Similar to the school in
Santa Fe, these actions communicate to students in attendance that the Board
has associated itself with Christian invocations and viewpoints.317 A student
sitting on the Board as a representative, performing in the student showcase, or
involved in an appeal or other disciplinary procedure before the Board is
inevitably exposed to a state-endorsed Christian message during the meeting and
undoubtedly coerced to conform to it.318 Any student of a different faith or who
simply disagrees with the message of the invocation would certainly feel
compelled to conform and participate in the religious exercise, especially when
given by one of the board members, knowing that the Board will witness the
student’s deliberate act of non-conformance to what is known to be the Board’s
preferred creed and practice.319 The compulsion here is beyond simply the desire
not to stand out. Rather, attending students feel pressured to conform because
the prayer bears “the imprint of the State,” making it indistinguishable from the
Board or school business and leading students to believe that adherence to the
religious exercise is the price of attending the meeting.320
The clear and substantial coercive effect on students is a result of the Board’s
control of and association with invocation speakers, the obligation of some
students to attend board meetings, and the obvious pressure to conform to a
religious exercise that is often Christian in nature and either performed by a
board member or vocally commended for its sectarian content. History and

officials, whose effort to monitor prayer will be perceived by students as inducing a participation they might
otherwise reject.”).
316
Based on the available Board minutes, only one invocation in 2013 was given by a member of a nonChristian church. See 2013 Board of Education Agendas and Minutes, supra note 305; see also Chino Valley,
896 F.3d at 1140 (concluding “Board members’ invocation of Christian beliefs, Bible readings, and further
prayer were a regular feature of Board meetings”). This included board members stating things such as “[our]
one goal is under God, Jesus Christ,” “everyone who does not know Jesus Christ to go and find Him,” “God
appointed us to be here,” and “[the pastor] was right, in his prayers, that I need [to] first look to Jesus Christ for
serving our students.” Id.
317
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“[A]n objective Santa Fe High School
student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of
approval.”).
318
Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at 1140 (“[Board members] explicit linkages of the work of the Board, teachers,
and the school community to Christianity, and their endorsement of prayer by the faculty, were frequent.”).
319
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (“[T]he school district’s supervision and control . . . places public pressure, as
well as peer pressure, on attending students . . . . This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion.”).
320
Id. at 590.
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subsequent practice show that the prayer opportunity is exploited by the Board
to proselytize to a captive audience of impressionable students, some of whom
are required to attend. Even longstanding history cannot save a “state-sanctioned
religious exercise in which the student [is] left with no alternative but to
submit.”321 Accordingly, the prayer practice here is unconstitutional under the
test proposed in this Comment.
D. American Humanist Association v. McCarty
At the start of regularly scheduled board meetings, the Birdville Independent
School Board asks two students chosen from a list of volunteers to stand before
the audience and Board.322 The first student leads the assembly in the U.S. and
Texas Pledges of Allegiance while the second offers an expression of their
choosing.323 Subsection one will analyze the coercive effect of the prayer policy.
Then, subsection two will balance the coercive effect of the policy against the
history and tradition of the practice to determine its constitutionality.
1. Coercion Analysis
First, the coercive effect of the policy must be analyzed to determine if it is
blatantly coercive or if the prayer opportunity is being taken advantage of to
proselytize, and thus cannot be justified by any longstanding history. Here, the
coercive effect present does not rise to a level that would invalidate the policy
without further balancing. While the process and setting present some coercion,
the Board controls neither the speaker nor the message, unlike the school
involvement in Lee, Santa Fe, and Chino Valley. Therefore, the risk that a
student will be compelled by the Board to participate in a religious exercise in
violation of their conscience is relatively low.
The school board setting inherently creates some coercive effect. Here,
board members sit at the front of the room on a raised platform able to observe
all audience members. Indeed, attending students have incentive not to raise the
ire of board members who not only broadly oversee their education but may hear
their individual claims and concerns. The process by which the prayer occurs
may also be coercive. Audience members are asked to stand to be led by a
student volunteer in the U.S. and Texas Pledges of Allegiance. Immediately
after, while still standing but without direction from the Board, the next student
volunteer takes center stage to offer their expression, which may be a prayer or
321
322
323

Id. at 597.
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id. Before 2015, the student expression was called the “invocation.” Id.
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other message. Students wishing not to participate must distinguish themselves
from all others and “profess publicly [their] disbelief.”324 A dissenting student
must either sit or leave in front of their community, classmates, and the Board.325
However, lessening this coercive effect is the fact that the Board plays
almost no role in the selection of the speaker or the content of their expression.
Instead, the policy largely gives the student speaker autonomy over their
message. This policy reads as follows:
The subject of the student introductions must be related to the purpose
of the event and to the purpose of marking the opening of the event;
honoring the occasion, the participants, and those in attendance;
bringing the audience to order; and focusing the audience on the
purpose of the event. A student must stay on the subject, and the
student may not engage in obscene, vulgar, offensively lewd, or
indecent speech. The District shall treat a student’s voluntary
expression of a religious viewpoint, if any, on an otherwise permissible
subject in the same manner the District treats a student’s voluntary
expression of a secular or other viewpoint on an otherwise permissible
subject and may not discriminate against the student based on a
religious viewpoint expressed by the student on an otherwise
permissible subject.326

Although this is a selective access forum like the football pregame prayer in
Santa Fe, here, a different student speaks at every Board meeting and, even
though the expression was originally titled “invocation,” there is no suggestion
that the message now must or should be a prayer. Indeed, the student expressions
vary and include moments of silence commemorating victims of terrorism,327
poems,328 personal stories about overcoming the challenges of teen
pregnancy,329 and messages encouraging others to stay positive during the
circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic.330 This is notably different
324

Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp., 374 U.S. 203, 289 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132,
1138 (9th Cir. 2018). Conversely, a student may choose to arrive a few minutes late to avoid participation without
missing substantive parts of the meeting, unlike those students asked to perform in Chino Valley.
326
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 524 n.6. The change from “invocation” to “student expression” further attenuates
the Board’s connection and regulation of what the student speaker may choose to say. Id. at 524.
327
Sep 28, 2017 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38322 (items D & E at 1:42).
328
Dec 14, 2017 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38326 (items D & E at 1:52).
329
Feb 22, 2018 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38329 (items D & E at 1:47).
330
Nov 19, 2020 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/107455 (item E at 2:38).
325
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from the policy and school involvement in the pre-game prayer at issue in Santa
Fe, in which the school “invit[ed] and encourag[ed] religious messages,”331 or
in Chino Valley, in which the Board itself often either directed the prayer or
explicitly endorsed it.332
Here, the Board allows students to broadly choose their topic with minimal
regulation. No indication is given that the Board favors or encourages religious
messages from students. For example, of the thirty video-recorded regular board
meetings where a student has given a voluntary student expression since 2017,
a prayer has been offered on only three occasions.333 The Board is passive and
neither approves nor disapproves of a student’s chosen message except for a
polite round of applause at the end.334 There is no evidence that the Board seeks
to convey a religious message through the student expression, adheres to or
promotes any particular religious belief, or exploits the opportunity to preach to
or convert those students in attendance.335
Further, the Board makes every effort during the student expression to
distinguish itself from whatever message the student speaker may offer. While
the student is offering their expression, a slide is projected above the board
members at the front of the room distinguishing the speaker and their message
from the Board.336 Any direction, such as to bow your head, associated with the
few prayers given is requested by the student speaker and not the Board, and the

331

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000).
Freedom From Religion Found. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1139
(9th Cir. 2018).
333
Jul 26, 2018 Regular Board Meetings, BIRDVILLE INDEP. SCH. DIST. (July 26, 2018), https://
birdvilleisdtx.new.swagit.com/videos/38335 (items D & E at 1:22; showing an eighteen-second prayer asking
for a successful meeting and school year); Feb 28, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, supra note 236 (items C & D
at 1:32) (showing a thirty-second prayer asking God to make sure everyone has a “great 2019”) (last visited Nov.
10, 2021); Jul 25, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, supra note 1 (items D & E at 2:15) (showing a forty-eightsecond prayer generally asking “the Lord” for help and guidance for all faculty and students).
334
Sep 28, 2017 Regular Board Meetings, supra note 327 (items D & E at 2:20).
335
Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (holding the moment of silence was unconstitutional
because it sought “to characterize prayer as a favored practice”).
336
Feb 28, 2019 Regular Board Meetings, supra note 236 (items C & D at 1:23). The message reads as
follows:
332

The student speaking at the board meeting was selected based on neutral criteria to deliver
messages of the student’s own choices. The content of the speaker’s message is the private
expression of the individual student and does not reflect any position or expression of the District,
the Board of Trustees, the District’s administration, or employees of the District. The contents of
this message were prepared by the student volunteer, and the District refrained from interaction
with the student speaker regarding their viewpoints on permissible subjects.
Id.
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extent of board member participation is to respectfully join.337 Although the
pressure exerted over those in attendance to join in the prayer may be coercive,
here, unlike Lee, Santa Fe, and Chino Valley, the prayers are not sanctioned,
overseen, or chosen by the Board.338 This hardly creates a perception that the
prayers or messages offered bear the imprimatur of the Board, and any student
in attendance may easily distinguish the student expression from the passive,
silent role played by board members while it is being conducted.
2. Balancing Coercion and History
Since the policy is not so coercive as to fail at the threshold, its coercive
elements must be weighed against the modest history and tradition of school
board prayer and official religious acknowledgment in public spaces. On
balance, this history and established tradition outweigh the relatively low
coercive effect of the policy.
The practice here does not indicate that the Board exploits the prayer
opportunity to proselytize, favor, or disparage any religion. Instead, the freely
volunteered student expressions, including the rare prayer, remind those present
to “transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and express a
common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”339 Indeed, the practice exists
in the same spirit as constitutional tolerant acknowledgment of our religious
heritage.
Evidence shows that the policy, rather than acting as a façade for government
endorsed prayer, largely promotes students to share their experiences and
accomplishments. When prayer is offered, it is hardly coercive given its brief,
embracive content, the autonomy of the student speaker, and the board’s
minimal role in oversight, regulation, and audience compulsion. Although
students may feel obliged to attend the meetings for several reasons, students are
not required to attend, and the only risk present is that they may hear the thoughts
or occasional beliefs of a fellow student.340 Outside of the normal pressure not
337

Id.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592 (1992) (discussing the “troubling” involvement of school
officials in choosing to have an invocation and who the speaker should be, which “may appear to the nonbeliever
or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy”); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (concluding the district’s policy “involves both perceived
and actual endorsement of religion”).
339
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575 (2014); see Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139
S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019) (noting the principles of acceptable prayer, which show “respect and tolerance for
differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition of the
important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans”).
340
See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (holding there is a
338
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to stand out from their peers, no evidence suggests that an attending student will
be coerced to participate in a state-sanctioned religious exercise. Given the
nature of the prayers—comparable to constitutional official acknowledgment of
faith and our religious heritage—and the low risk of coercion, the policy does
not violate the Establishment Clause.
In Lee, the Court cautioned “there will be instances when religious values,
religious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the
public school and their students.”341 Here, the risk of true coercion to students
in attendance is minor given the minimal role served by the Board in conducting
the expressions, the autonomy given to the student speaker, and the brief and
varied messages offered. The policy poses no practical threat of an establishment
of religion. Therefore, on balance, the policy is constitutional considering the
low risk of coercion and the modest history and tradition of prayer and religious
acknowledgment in public life.
CONCLUSION
No Establishment Clause test can perfectly address the concerns of every
situation and prayer context that might arise. While Lemon may have attempted
to create a “grand unified theory,” the Court has since found such an approach
unworkable.342 Instead, Establishment Clause analysis is fact sensitive and any
test must be appropriately tailored to allow courts to apply the law accurately
and appropriately, rather than forcing new situations into pre-existing
frameworks made for different contexts. This is most clear in the school board
prayer context where lower courts have attempted to apply either the legislative
prayer doctrine or school prayer jurisprudence.
While the legislative prayer doctrine is effective in recognizing that religion
is tolerated to some degree in our public life, in other contexts outside of the
legislature that lack such a benign history of ceremonial prayer, it may permit
acts which veer close to government sponsorship of religion. Similarly, where
the coercion test understandably seeks to protect impressionable young students
from compelled, state-sponsored religious acts while at school, it could be rigid
and antithetical to our religious history when applied to situations involving

constitutional difference between government endorsement of religion and private endorsement of religion).
341
Lee, 505 U.S. at 597, 598–99 (“People may take offense at all manner of religious as well as
nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation.”).
342
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087 (“While the Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified
theory of the Establishment Clause, in later cases, we have taken a more modest approach that focuses on the
particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance.”).
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adults and longstanding, traditional practices. The inability of lower courts to
transpose these doctrines to the school board—a setting with elements that
encompass several areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence—is itself
evidence that a more tailored mode of analysis is needed and preferrable to
fitting square pegs in round holes.
The test this Comment proposes to adequately analyze school board prayer
includes the relevant elements of both the legislative prayer doctrine and the
coercion test to satisfy the concerns unique to the school board and follows
Supreme Court guidance most recently rearticulated in American Legion.
Indeed, both the legislative prayer doctrine and coercion tests were crafted to
review prayer in particular settings. The school board should be no different.
Using coercion as a threshold permits a reviewing court to allay the concerns
regarding impressionable students who are present at the school board meeting
or the target of its work. Similarly, balancing less coercive elements against
history and tradition allows for some religious acknowledgement, which follows
in the best of our traditions and adheres to the Court’s definitive command that
the Establishment Clause be “interpreted by reference to historical practices and
understandings.”343 This test both recognizes that “[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” and prevents the dais of the
school board from becoming the pulpit.344 It is tailored to better fit the school
board context and incorporates appropriate elements of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, a compromise insisted upon by the Court’s precedent and a
faithful application of the law.
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